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Summary findings
Few areas of the world have escaped significant losses  In a companion paper (Caprio and Klingebiel, "Bank
from episodes of bank insolvency. Bank insolvency is  Insolvency: Bad Luck, Bad Policy, or Bad Banking?" in
more costly in the developing world, where losses  Michael Bruno and Boris Pleskovic, eds., Annual World
represent a greater share of income than in industrial  Bank Conference on Development Economics 1996,
economies and where it is therefore doubly important to  Washington, DC: World Bank, forthcoming) the authors
prevent these episodes.  discuss possible preventatives and the tradeoffs between
Caprio and Klingebiel present data on episodes of  safety and soundness, on the one hand, and efficiency,
bank insolvency since the late 1970s. This new database  on the other.  (How high should capital reserves be, for
can be used in conjunction with readily available data  example?) Meanwhile, this initial database suggests
(for example, on GDP, inflation, fiscal balances,  further avenues for research.
monetary growth, and trade balances). Information and  There is a dearth of widely available indicators on
insights are presented in seven tables on:  bank performance.  This might have been understandable
*  Episodes of major bank insolvencies and systemic  in the early 1980s but not today, considering the number
banking crises (country, scope of crisis, and estimate of  of episodes of bank insolvency. The damage done to
losses).  Mexico's economy during the 1994-95  crisis and the
* Main characteristics of banking crises (magnitude,  estimates of enormous  losses from some Brazilian banks
cost of resolution, mechanism of resolution, growth in  dramatize the significance of the problem. More
new loans, and GDP).  attention should be focused on developing indicators that
* Terms of trade in crisis countries.  might predict bank insolvency for individual banks and
* Characteristics of restructuring.  systems as a whole.
* Financial analysis of crisis countries (financial  Caprio and Klingebiel devise criteria for assessing how
deepening, real credit/GDP, real deposit interest rates,  governments deal with insolvency and find that countries
and recurrent problems).  handle it well. The companion  paper makes
* Outcome of restructuring in crisis countries.  recommendations for addressing this failure.
This paper - a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Division, Policy Research Department - is part
of a larger effort in the department  to study the causes and consequences of bank insolvency. Copies of the paper are
available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Bill Moore, room N9-038,
telephone 202-473-8526,  fax 202-522-1155,  Internet  address bmoore@worldbank.org. July 1996. (52 pages)
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The authors are, respectively,  Lead Economist,  Policy Research Department,  and Consultant, Western
African Department. This paper, and its companion  paper, benefitted  from comments by Phil Brock,
Charles Calomiris, Elena Folkerts-Landau,  Philip Keefer, Homi Kharas, Ross Levine, Millard Long,
Herminia  Martinez,  Patrick Honohan,  Boris Pleskovic,  Andrew Sheng, Mary Shirley,  and Shahid  Yusuf.
Alexander  Tanzi supplied competant  research  assistance,  and colleagues  in various regions of the World
Bank provided helpful information  on individual  country  cases. Given  the difficulty  in securing  accurate
and standardized  information  on the banking  systems,  data contained  herein should be used with caution.Episodes of bank insolvency have increased in recent years and few areas of the world
have escaped without significant losses. Although the losses per se may be belittled as
being "just a transfer," they signal a misallocation of resources, since if banks had
selected profitable projects, more than likely loans would have been repaid.  Moreover,
the transfer payments entailed as a result of banking losses often are huge, in many cases
10-20% of GDP and occasionally as much as 40-55% of GDP, if the higher estimates of
losses in Chile and Argentina are correct.  Large scale transfers of this magnitude cannot
be easily handled by most governments and can be expected to derail stabilization
programs, as authorities will prefer to rely on less conspicuous taxes, including inflation.
This paper reproduces the data gathered in the last year on episodes of bank
insolvency that have occurred since the late-  I 970s for the benefit of researchers and
others interested in this area.  It is the first such effort and necessarily contains a number
of flaws.  First and foremost, it relies upon the assessment of a variety of finance
professionals in pulling together characterizations of factors that have caused crises, as
we will henceforth dub insolvency episodes, and for information on their resolution.
Only published sources or interviews with experts familiar with individual episodes were
employed.  In the future, as greater attention is focused on banking problems, there is the
hope that more systematic and quantitative sources will be available.  Second, for many
countries there are no published, comparable data for banks which would permit outsiders
to know with great precision the solvency of the institution. Marking bank portfolios to
market is treacherous in industrial countries, where many loans are not traded, and it is
doubly so in developing and transitional economies.  Third, it is difficult to time these2
episodes of bank insolvency.  Overt crises, such as those involving a run on banks and/or
on a country's  currency, are relatively easy to date, but these are only a subset of the
episodes reviewed here.  Financial distress, in which the banking system has negative net
worth, can occur over a period of time and indeed even persist before being detected.
The dates attached to the crises reviewed here are those generally accepted by finance
experts familiar with the countries, but their accuracy is difficult to determine in the
absence of the means to mark portfolios to market values.  Similarly, it is not always
clear when a crisis is over, and in the case of countries in which there are multiple
episodes, it may well be that later events are merely a continuation of those occurring
earlier.  Lastly, it should be noted that there are no policy conclusions presented here, as
they are contained in a companion paper (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996).
The Data
Table 1 presents the entire sample of 69 countries for which information was available,
with those countries in which the episode appeared to be systemic, in the sense of much
or all of bank capital being exhausted in the first part of the table, and the smaller or more
borderline episodes in the second part.'  As noted in Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), some
judgment has gone into the compilation of this list, not only for the countries in which
data are absent on the size of the losses but also in that in many cases the official
estimates understate the size of the problem.  There likely were countries not shown
which had smaller crises since the late 1  970s, but about which relatively little was
written, and hence they have been omitted from the table.  Moreover, virtually every3
transitional economy (TE) at some stage in the transition process belongs on the
(systemic) list; however, in the interest of limiting the number of countries with missing
information these were excluded.  Including all the TEs would bring the number of
countries covered to about 90 and the episodes to well over 100.
Table 2 turns to a subset of 26 countries (29 cases) for which more detailed
information was available and reviews the factors cited as important causes of the crisis,
its size and the resolution cost, a brief note on the approach taken in this resolution
process, and the real credit and real GDP growth leading up to the episode. A closer look
at this subset of banking system insolvencies further shows that a variety of factors
(column 1) can be cited as causes of the banking crisis.  Macro factors were at least a
2 contributing factor in all of the banking crises in our subset.  But a weak incentive
system for banks also figured prominently (Caprio and Klingebiel). Whereas the former
tended to be more proximate and obvious once the banking crisis was brought to public
attention (either by bank runs or by the government issuing a guarantee on deposits),
weaknesses in the latter tended to exacerbate the magnitude of the crisis.  With respect to
the accounting framework, in many countries it was mostly left to the banks' discretion
when to list a loan as non-performing and whether to show accrued interest as paid -- in
other words, existing regulations were lax.  If they existed at all, prescribed capital to
asset ratios were generally set at low levels, single borrower and other exposure limits
were mostly non-existent or very lenient.  Poor lending decisions, lack of managerial
skills, and fraud were in some of the cases (e. g. in Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Thailand,
Colombia) additional contributing factors to the crisis, as well as lending to related4
parties and politically motivated loans (Benin, Chile, Philippines, Ghana, Indonesia,
Turkey, Brazil).  Better supervision might have revealed and halted these problems
earlier, if political forces were conducive to allowing supervisors to take prompt
corrective action.
The magnitude of the crisis episodes of our subset ranged from affecting banks
controlling around 70-90% of banking system assets (Benin 1988-90, Guinea 1985, Ivory
Coast 1988-9 1, Poland 1991) to banks accounting for around 40-60% of banking system
assets (Philippines, Argentina 89/90, Chile, Estonia).  A relatively smaller but still very
large share of the banking sector was affected in Uruguay (30% of financial system
deposits), Senegal (20-30% of financial system assets), Colombia (25% of banking
system assets) and Spain (20% of total deposits).  The Malaysian banking crisis appears
relatively minor compared to these episodes; institutions which accounted for only 3.3%
of financial system deposits were found to be insolvent with another 4.4% of marginally
solvent institutions.
Table 3 shows the change in the terms of trade in the years leading up to the crisis.
Volatile terms of trade are particularly troublesome for economies that are highly
concentrated, and Table 4 reveals that many developing countries tend to be much more
concentrated, as proxied by the importance of top 3-4 items in exports.  Export
concentration typically was substantially greater in the countries experiencing systemic
problems from those with only borderline episodes.  With concentrated economies,
domestic banks often cannot protect themselves from volatility if they are constrained to
domestic investments which, as a result of capital controls, often is the case.5
Turning to the resolution of bank insolvency, Table 5 attempts to characterize the
steps taken, including changes in macro policies and a variety of variables meant to
capture changes in different aspects of the incentive system confronting bankers.  Note
here that we sought to identify instances where countries adopted a resolution mechanism
that included among other measures a recapitalization of the banking system, in order to
illustrate the importance of addressing incentives and getting the message across that poor
performance is costly.  Also, in arriving at our sample we were influenced by the
availability of information.
The resolution of bank insolvency proved to be very expensive in our subset,
placing a heaven burden on the country and on the government's budget, though a caveat
is important here as we have not been able to include that part of the burden born by
depositors and borrowers in the form of widened spreads for bad loans that were left on
banks' balance sheets. 3 Among the episodes with available data, Argentina's banking
crisis in the early 1  980s proved to be the most expensive restructuring exercise,
amounting to 55.3% of GDP, followed by the Chile with a price tag of over 40% of GDP,
COte d'Ivoire 25% and Benin and Senegal costing 17% of GDP.  Up to March 1995,
Venezuela has spent 13% of GDP on the resolution of its banking crisis, and more recent
numbers in the press put the cost at 18% of GDP or higher.  Less expensive but still a
heavy burden on the country placed the ongoing restructuring in Hungary, amounting to
about 10% of GDP and the restructuring in Uruguay and Ghana, costing 7% and 6% of
GDP, respectively.  All of these cases, were characterized by large interest rate spreads,
as often is the case when insolvency is a problem (Brock, 1995). And although the6
banking crisis reportedly only affected a small fraction of the banking system in
Malaysia, estimated losses of all financial institutions added up to 4.7% of GNP.
All of these numbers deserve some suspicion, as governments can bail out banks
in a variety of ways, such as by giving a subsidy to a borrower, granting the borrower
some monopoly privilege or other means to improve its profits and thereby repay loans,
or by directly injecting funds to banks.  Not surprisingly, the cost of indirect methods can
be difficult to estimate.
Although some of the episodes of banking system insolvencies are still being
resolved, a few preliminary observations can be made.  Governments were successful in
dealing with macro imbalances -- that is to lower their budget deficit, to bring down
inflation and/or to devalue its currency to address external imbalances -- in only six cases
(Chile, Estonia, Finland, Malaysia, Spain and Thailand);  a relatively stable policy regime
was already in place in the United States; in Benin, C6te dlvoire and Senegal, inflation
declined but it was not until several years later that currency overvaluation was corrected.
In 16 other cases, macro imbalances either were addressed inadequately or only partly
resolved, resulting in a continuation of the volatile macro environment.
The strengthening of the regulatory and accounting framework and the
enforcement thereof constitute the other important components of the external incentive
system within which banks operate.  Some changes were introduced in all of the cases of
our subset.  However, only in sixteen cases can these changes be considered to be
substantial encompassing the introduction or strengthening of  capital/asset ratios, single
borrower as well as other risk exposure limits, the prohibition of connected lending and7
limits to lending to bank officers and board members as well as the implementation of
standardized rules for asset valuation and loan provisioning. 4 Argentina and Brazil
implemented a satisfactory accounting and regulatory framework for their private banks
but only recently started to extend these frameworks to the public banking system.  For
the rest of the cases the changes made cannot be considered to be satisfactory.  Only eight
of the 16 cases (Benin, Chile, C6te d'Ivoire, Finland, Malaysia, Colombia, Spain and the
United States) in which the regulatory and accounting framework was substantially
strengthened also saw significant improvements in the enforcement of improved
regulations.
Regarding the internal incentive framework, shown in the last four columns of
Table 5, we also observe notable differences in whether governments implemented
performance monitoring programs for banks,  put measures into place that halted lending
to borrowers in default, made attempts to collect on written off loans, and changed senior
bank management.  All of these measures are important, in that they reduce the scope for
"evergreening" loans (make bad loans look good by lending more funds) and send a clear
signal that debts need to be repaid and that losses will be penalized. In ten cases,
annual performance monitoring programs by reputable outside auditors were put into
place, while in two cases (Uruguay, Poland), this measure was only adopted for a subset
of the banks in the system.  In at least four cases of our subset (Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea,
Nigeria, and Senegal), no such program was implemented. Banks stopped lending to
borrowers in default in nine of the cases for which information was available; in at least
four cases lending to borrowers in default was nQ=  halted.  Poor legal frameworks often8
proved to be an important hindrance in attempts of banks or institutions that took over
bad loans to collect on written off loans.  Government  failure to improve the legislative
framework for banks to enforce their loan contracts also proved to become a hindrance
for extension of new loans in the aftermath of the crisis (e.g., banks in C6te d'Ivoire cite
an inefficient legal framework as a major reason for their unwillingness to lend). It also
drives up the risk premiums banks charge, thus leading to higher overall lending rates that
adversely affects the private sector. In fifteen instances the affected banks or agencies
appeared to make serious attempts to collect on written off loans.  Finally, in the majority
of cases (12) for which such information was available did the government change the
senior bank management of the restructured banks.  In addition, in Poland twinning
arrangements with foreign banks were set up and bank managers of state-owned banks
received part of their compensation in the form of stock options, which have become
valuable in light of the credible privatization process there.  This improved incentive
system and clear progress towards private ownership likely influenced incentives for
prudent risk taking.  On the contrary, in Hungary senior bank management was not let go,
muting any signal regarding performance.  Several Ghanaian bank managers merely
appear to have rotated assignments, muting any signal regarding performance.
Turning to an evaluation of the restructuring attempts, Table 6 shows how
countries scored on the criteria developed elsewhere (Caprio and Klingebiel) for
assessing the success of responses to insolvency.  Briefly, countries received a mark if
financial depth rose after the crisis to levels above that seen in the pre-crisis period; if real
interest rates on deposits were neither excessively negative (below -5%) nor excessively9
positive  (+10%);  if real credit growth  to the nongovernment  sector was positive  but not
well above (2.5 times)  real GDP growth;  and if there was no recurrence  of a significant
episode of bank insolvency. As seen in the Table,  only Chile and Malaysia  received  the
highest  rating (4) among  those in the developing  world. Table  7 presents  the detailed
data on the measures.
Conclusions
This brief paper  has laid out a new information  base on bank insolvency  and can be
complemented  by more readily  available  macro  data, such as GDP, inflation,  fiscal
balances,  monetary  growth,  trade balances,  etc. 5 Three  issues stand  out with great
clarity. First, there is a dearth  of widely  available  indicators  on bank performance.
Although  this absence  was understandable  at the start  of the 1  980s, it is hardly so today,
given the number  of episodes  and the absent of any convincing  signs  that they are
receding  in significance. Indeed,  the aamage  done to Mexico's economy  during  the
1994-95  crisis and the enormous  cost estimates  for losses in some  Brazilian  banks
underline  the significance  of the problem. Greater  attention  should  focus on correcting
this lacuna, including  the development  of indicators  that might predict  the occurrence  of
these problems,  both at the individual  bank level but especially  for the banking  system as
a whole.
Second,  relatively  few countries  scored  well  on handling  bank insolvency. To be
sure, for several  countries  insufficient  time has passed,  and the criteria  are not above
reproach  -- though  the authors' priors were  that they  were excessively  lenient. If few
governments  handle  crises  well, then  this suggests  that an analysis  of the political10
economy  of bank insolvency  would  potentially  pay a high return. Third, and related  to
the prevalence  of bank insolvency,  is the fact that they are more costly in the developing
world -- losses  have tended  to be larger  relative  to income  than in industrial  economies.
Large losses  would increase  the importance  of preventing  these episodes. The
companion  paper to the present  one summarizes  different  possible  preventatives,  all of
which involve increasing  the stake  of bank owners  and managers  in ensuring  the safety
and soundness  of their institutions. These  solutions  all may entail less competition  in
banking,  and a variety of issues then arise  for research. For example,  more analysis  of
how high capital  levels should  be to prevent  bank insolvency  in the developing  world
would make an important  contribution  to welfare,  as would  some  consideration  of the
tradeoffs  between safety  and soundness,  on the one hand, and efficiency  on the other.
Lastly,  the experiments  of country's such  as New Zealand,  with more market-based
monitoring,  and of the United  States,  with its attempts  to tie the hands of supervisors,  cry
out for future research.11
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Notes
I  In cases in which  net capital  was positive  according  to official  data but likely  negative  based  on
statements  of experts,  we sided  with  the latter.  Decisions  on when  one crisis ends and another  begins  are
necessarily  arbitrary,  hence  it is possible  to differ on whether  some cases  represent  multiple  crises  or a
continuation  of the preceding  one.  Although  it would  be possible  to apply  the indicators  of success  (noted
in the next section)  and use them to note the end of a crisis,  that would  mean  that many cases  would
involve  ongoing  crisis.
2  Except  for three cases  (Poland 1  990s,  Brazil 1994,  and Turkey  1994)  in our subset,  all countries
experienced  a terms of trade  (ToT) decline  of at least 10%  prior to the crisis. Ghana  (-60%),  Ivory  Coast  (-
47%) and Nigeria  (-50%)  experienced  a very sharp  fall in the ToT in  the period before  banking  problems
came  to the forefront.  Moreover,  the period  prior the crisis was characterized  by fast and sometimes
explosive  loan growth.  In 9 cases real loans  grew significantly  (2.5 times or more) faster than real  GDP.
3  Loss  allocation  is an important  part of the restructuring  mechanism  which  also determines  the
future monitoring  of banks  by their depositors. Potential  bearers  of losses  include  shareholders,  healthy
banks, depositors  and borrowers  of the insolvent  institutions,  and  the govemment. Losses  to depositors  can
be allocated  through a write-down  of their uninsured  deposits,  through  the conversion  of their deposits  into
bank equity,  or both. They  also incur  losses  if the government  imposes  interest  rates  that are below  their
"market  rates". If uninsured  depositors  are completely  bailed  out, that  raises their expectations  of a future
bailout  and lowers  their incentive  to monitor  bank behavior  in the future. Losses  can be distributed  to the
govemment  through central  bank assistance,  guarantee  of bank deposits,  tax write  off of bad loans,  or
direct intervention.  Losses  are then passed  on to the tax payer or, if they lead to budget  deficits  which are
financed  through  monetary  expansion,  to the currency  holding  public.
4  Admittedly,  this is a judgment,  based  on conversations  with  bank supervisors  and financial
economists,  as well  as various  country  reports.  It also  needs  to be noted,  that even  within  this subgroup
substantial  differences  in the prudential  regulatory  framework  still  exists  including  different  capital  to asset
ratio (currently  4% in Benin  and C6te  d'lvoire but 8% in Colombia)  and  different  single  borrower  limits
(100% in Benin and C6te  d'lvoire and 30% in Malaysia).
5  This  information  is readily  available  through  the IMF's International  Financial  Statistics.Annex Table  1  13
Episodes of Major  Bank  Insolvencies
I. Episodes  of Systemic Banking  Crises
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C6te  d'lvoire  4 big banks  affected  accounted  for 90% of  Government  costs estimated  at CFA677
1988-1991  banking system  loans; 3 definitely  and one  bn (25%  of GDP).
perhaps  insolvent.
Eritrea  Most  of the banking  system  is insolvent.
1993
Ghana  7 audited banks (out of 11) insolvent; rural  Restructuring costs estimated at 6% of
1982-1989  banking  sector  affected.  GNP.
Guinea  6 banks  accounting  for 99% of total  system  Repayment  of deposits  amounted  to 3%
1985  deposits.  of 1986  GDP.
1993-94  2 banks  insolvent  accounting  for 22.4  % of
financial  system  assets;  one other  bank in serious
trouble;  3 banks  together  account  for  45% of the
market.
Kenya  4 banks and 24 non-bank financial institutions
1985-89  faced  liquidity  and solvency  problems  together
accounting  for 15%  of total liabilities  of financial
system.
1992  Intervention  into  two local banks.
1993-95  Serious  systemic  problems  with  banks  accounting
for more  than 30% of assets  of the financial
system  facing  solvency  problems.Annex Table 1  14
Episodes of Major Bank Insolvencies
1. Episodes of Systemic Banking Crises
.,,..~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  ~~~~~~~~~~~  .. ~~...........  .
Madagascar  25% of loans deemed irrecoverable.
1988
Mauritania  1984: 5c  major banks had non-performing assets  Cost of rehabilitation estimated at 15%
1984 - 1993  ranging from 45%-70% of their portfolio.  of GDP in 1988.
Mozambique  BCM, main commercial bank, experiences
1987 - present  solvency problems which become apparent after
1992
Nigeria  1993. insolvent banks account for 20% of total
1990s  assets and 22% of banking system deposits; 1995:
almost half of the banks are reported to be in
financial distress.
Senegal  6 commercial banks and I development bank  US$830 million which is equivalent to
1988 to 1991  closed accounting for roughly 20 - 30%/o  of  17% of GDP.
financial system assets.
South Africa  Trust Bank
1977
Tanzania  1987: the main financial institutions had arrears  1987: implied losses amount to nearly
1987; 1995  amounting to half of their portfolio;  10% of GNP.
1995: NBC, which accounts for 95% of the assets
of the banking system has been insolvent for the
last 3 to 5 years possibly longer.
Togo
1993, 1994, 1995




Zambia  Meridian Bank became insolvent which accounted  Rough estimate of US$50 million (1.4%
1995  for 13% of commercial bank assets.  of GDP).
Bangladesh  In 1987, 4 banks account. for 70% of total credit
late 1980s-present  had estimated 20% of NPLs;
late 1980s up to now, entire private/public banking
system is technically insolvent.Annex Table 1  15
Episodes of Major Bank Insolvencies
I. Episodes of Systemic Banking Crises
.,  Xw  t  w
India
1994/95
Nepal  In early 1988 the reported arrears of 3 banks (95%
1988  of financial system) averaged 29% of all assets.
Philippines  2 public banks accounting for 50% of banking  At its peak, central bank assistance to
1981-1987  system assets, 6 private banks accounting for 12%  financial institutions amounted to 19.1 bn
of banking system assets, 32 thrifts accounting for  pesos (3% of GDP).
53.2% of thrift banking assets and 128 rural banks.
Sri Lanka  State-owned banks comprising 70% of banking  Restructuring cost amounted to 25 bn
1989-93  system have estimated non-performing loans of  rupees (5% of GDP).
about 35% of total loan portfolio.
Thailand  Authorities intervened in 50 finance and security  Government cost for 50 finance companies
1983-87  firms & 5 commercial banks or about 25% of total  estimated at 0.5% of GNP; government
financial system assets;  3 commercial banks  cost for subsidized loans amounted to
judged insolvent (14.1% of commercial banking  about 0.2% of GDP annually.
assets).
..  .. ..  X  ,  j.  --  . ,  ,,  .,  -
Costa Rica  1987: public banks accounting for 90% of total  Implied losses of at least twice the capital




Mexico  Commercial banks past due to gross loan ratio  Accumulated losses are estimated at 12-
1995  reaches 9.3% in February 1995.  15% of GDP.
t  At*.:j'
Argentina  1980-82: more than 70 institutions were liquidated  55.3% of GDP.
1980-82  or subject to central bank intervention accounting
for 16% of assets of commercial banks and 35% of
total assets of finance companies.
Argentina
1989/90  All banks or 50% of deposits.
1995  Suspension of eight banks and collapse of three
banks.
Bolivia  5 banks  were liquidated; total NPLs of banking
1986-87  system reached 29.8% in 1987; in mid-1988
reported arrears stood at 92% of commercial
banks' net worth.Annex Table 1  16
Episodes of Major Bank Insolvencies
I.  Episodes of Systemic Banking Crises
Brazil  (deposit to bond conversion)
(1  990)
1994/95  2 large state banks insolvent, as well as the seventh  Estimate: negative net worth of selected
largest private bank; licenses of 11 small banks  state and federal banks estimated at 5-10%
revoked.  of GDP; recent estimates put Banespa's
losses alone at US$ 15-20 bn., the largest
failure as of early 1996.
Chile  entire mortgage system insolvent.
1976
1981-83  1983: 7 banks and I financiera accounting for  1982 - 1985: government spent 41.2% of
45% of total assets.  GDP.
Colombia  Central Bank intervened in 6 banks accounting for  rough estimate: 5% of GDP.
1982-87  25% of banking system assets.
Ecuador  Implementation of exchange program (domestic
early 1980s  for foreign debt) to bail out banking system
Paraguay  Government superintendency intervened in two
1995  inter connected commercial banks, 2 other banks
and 6 related finance houses, accounting for ]0%
of financial system deposits.
Uruguay  affected institutions accounted for 30% of  Estimated costs of recapitalizing banks
1981-84  financial system assets; insolvent banks accounted  estimated at US$350 million (7% of GNP);
for 20% of financial system deposits.  Central Bank's quasi-fiscal losses
associated with subsidized credit
operations and purchase of loan portfolios
amounted to 24.2% of GDP during 1982-
85.
Venezuela  Banco Nacional de Descuento; Banco de
1980?  Commercio; Banco de los Trabajuderos;
1994/95  insolvent banks accounted for 30% of financial  Estimated losses put at over 18% of GDP.
system deposits.
Egypt  Government closed several large investment
early 1980s  companies.
1990-9  1Annex Table 1  17
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Israel  Virtually the entire banking sector affected,  About 30% of GDP in 1983.
1977-83  representing 60% of stock market capitalization.
Stock exchange closed for 18 days; bank share
prices fell over 40%.
Kuwait  An estimated 40% of loans were non-performing
1980s  by 1986.
Morocco
early 1980s
Turkey  Five banks were rescued; since 1985, 2 large  1982-85: rescue cost equivalent to 2.5% of
1982-85  banks were restructured.  GNP.
..  i  I  *,  ¢  I  ,  i,  ,  ,,.  ..... ,.,..:......  ..-
Bulgaria  1995: an estimated 75% of all loans in banking  the banking sector's losses may have
1990s  system were substandard; banking systems run in  amounted to as much as 14% of GDP.
early 1996.
Estonia  insolvent banks: 41% of financial system assets.  recapitalization outlays for new entity 300
1992  million EEK (1.4% of GDP).
1994  Social Bank which controlled 10% of financial
system assets.
Hungary  2nd half of 1993: 8 banks (25% of financial  Overall resolution cost is estimated to
1991-95  system assets) insolvent.  amount to 10% of GDP.
Latvia  largest bank and nine other banks together
1995  accounting for 40% of total banking system assets.
Lithuania  In December 1995, Central Bank suspended of
1995 - 1996  countries largest private bank and one mid-size
private bank; these actions followed interventions
in two smaller banks earlier in the year.
Poland  7 of 9 treasury owned banks with 90% share of  1993: recap. costs of US$ 750 million for
1990s  total credit market in 1991; Bank for Food  seven commercial banks; recap. costs for
Economy and cooperative banking sector.  Bank for Food Economy and cooperative
banking sector amounted to US$900
million.
Romania  Many loans to SOEs doubtful.  Agricultural bank recapitalized with wide
1990-93  interest margins.
Russia  On August 24, 1995, interbank loan market
1995  stopped working; concern about connected lending
in many new banks.Annex Table 1  18
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Slovenia  Recap. costs of US$1.3 bn.
1990s
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Finland  Savings banking sector badly affected;  Recap. costs amounted to 8% of GDP.
1991-1993  Government took over control of  Skopbank in
August 1991; several banks also suffered losses
due to bad loans and share investments.
Japan  Banks are suffering from sharp decline in stock  Rescue costs probably higher than
1990s  market and real estate prices; official estimate of  US$100 bn.
NPLs: 40 trillion Yen (US$469 bn) in 1995 (10%
of GDP); unofficial estimates reach I trillion or
25% of GDP; for some of bad loans banks have
already made provisions.
Norway  Central Bank provided special loans to six banks,  Recap. costs amounted to 4% of GDP.
1987-89  suffering from post-oil recession of 1985-86 and
from problem real estate loans; state took control
of 3 largest banks, partly through a Government
Bank Investment Fund (Nkr 5 bn) and the state-
backed Bank Insurance Fund had to increase
capital to Nkr 11 bn.
Spain  1978-83: 51 institutions holding 1/5  of all deposits  Estimated losses of banks were
1977-85  were rescued;  equivalent to approximately 16.8% of
1983: govemment nationalized 20 small/medium  GNP.
sized banks.
Sweden  1991: government injected Skr 5 bn (US$800  Cost of recap. amounted to 6.4 % of
1991  million) into state controlled Nordbanken, and  GDP.
guaranteed US$609 million loan to save largest
savings banks.Annex Table 1  19
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Hong Kong  9 Deposit Taking Companies failed.
1982-83
1983-86  7 banks or Deposit Taking Institutions were either
liquidated or taken over.
Indonesia  Classified assets equal to over 14% of banking  Recapitalization cost for five state
1994  system assets with over 70% in the state banks.  banks expected to amount to 1.8% of
GDP.
Malaysia  Insolvent institutions account for 3.4% of financial  Reported losses equivalent to 4.7%
1985-88  system deposits; marginally capitalized and  of GNP.
perhaps insolvent institutions account for another
4.4% of financial system deposits.
Singapore  Domestic commercial banks' non-performing loans
1982  rose to about $ 200 million or 0.63% of GDP.
Taiwan  4 trust companies and II cooperatives failed.
1983-84
1995  Failure of credit cooperative Changua Fourth in
late July which sparks runs on other credit unions
in central and southern Taiwan.
..  ...  ..  . . ,  . . . .:-  - ,  -- :.  :  -- 
Australia  2 large banks received capital from government to
1989/90  cover losses.
Unofficial estimates of losses put at
France  Credit Lyonnais.  about $10 billion, the largest single
1994/95  bank failure up to that time.
Germany  So called Giroinstitutions faced problems.
late 1970s
Great Britain  "Secondary Banking Crisis".
1974- 1976
New Zealand
1987-90Annex Table 1  20
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The United States  More than 1,400 savings & loans and  1,300 banks  Cost of savings & loan clean up
1984-91  failed.  amounted to an estimated US$ 180
billion equivalent to 3.2% of GDP.
Sources:  World Bank Financial Sector Reviews and Country Economic Memoranda, interviews with Bank Financial Sector
Specialists, and:  Sheng, 1995; World Bank, 1990, p.53; IMF, 1995; Baer/Klingebiel,  1994; Vittas, 1992; V. Sundararajan, V.
Thomas, J.T. Balino, 1991; The Banker. 1995; Jorge Marshall & K. Schmidt-Hebbel, 1994; Rodriguez, 1994; World Bank. 1989;
Felipe Morris/ Mark Dorfman/ Jose Pedro Ortiz & Maria Claudio Franco. 1990: Blass and Grossman, 1995: Fleming and Talley, 1996;
The Economist,  1995-96: Financial Times, 1995; Borish, Long, and Noel. 1994.Table 2: The Main Characteristics of the Banking Crises  21
Af,rica
Benin  *  public banks lending  to parastatal  *  80% of entire  l  losses amounted  to 95hn  . all existing  banks were liquidated  and tour  -25.0, 27  (1985-87)
1988-90  enterprises  which were facing  severe  banking  system's loan  CFA franc which  was  private  banks w ith an initial  capital  of CFA I
liquidity/solvency  problems  due to  portfolio  was non-  equivalent  to 17% of GDP.  billion  each were established  during the period
inappropriate  financial  and economic  performing.  1988-90.
policies  and tight central control  on the
economv:
terms of trade deterioration and post
1982 slump in regional trade contributed to
dismal financial situation of public sector
enterprises;
a  crisis became apparent when
govemment's  decision to sequester the
bank accounts of tax delinquent prompted
large outflow of funds, which coupled with
large share of  NPLs. resulted  in liquidity
crisis in last quarter of 1987.
C6te  *  To r  deterioration of 40%/, led to public  *  4 big banks  of which 3  *  25% ofGDP  . 2 public housing development  banks and 2  -3.0. 2.3 (1985 - 87)
d'lvoire  sector arrears  at commercial banks:  definitely and  I perhaps  industrial development  banks were liquidated  in
1988-91  *  excessive anld  distorted taxation, real  insolvent = 90% of  1988 and 89;
appreciation of foreign exchange rate  banking svstem  loans or  *  the agricultural development  (B3NDA)  with
rendered corporate sector increasingly  65-70%  of banking  liabilities of CFA 48.7bn was liquidated in  1991
uncompetitive and reduced  its ability to  system assets.  after recapitalization  efforts proved fruitless:
service debt;  . 4 large banks accounting for 65-70% of
*  shortcomings  in regulatory and  financial system assets were recapitalized;
accounting framework as well as  *  recapitalization  involved three steps: (i)
inadequate banking supervision;  settlement of govemment  direct and indirect
banking sector also suffered  from high  arrears; (ii) absorption of past losses by existiig
operating  costs, inadequate loan  public and private shareholders on a pro rata
monitoring and politically motivated loans.  basis; (iii) recapitalization  by main private
shareholders, wvith  government  reducing  its stake
to maximum of 20%; (iv) (iv) settlement of
govemment  arrears to domestic creditors other
than banking sector.Table  2: The Main Characteristics of the Banking  Crises  22
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Ghana  . serious shortcomings in regulatory and  . 7 audited banks (out of  *  6%ofGDP:  . commcrcial banking sector:rcstructuringof  -'5.4.-1.7(1979-81)
1982-89  accounting  framezsork, inadequate banking  11) insolvent  . depositors did  not bear  9 banks was achieved by removing trom banks'  7.6  .52 (1986-88)
supervision and inappropriate sector  *  rural banking sector  any losses in nominal  ioan portfolio part of their non-perf. loans  to a
policies:  afiected.  terms, but had home  recover.agency:
*  deficient bank management and internal  significant losses in earlier  *  part of non-perform. private sector loans
controls:  years due to financial  was replaced by government  bonds;  public
*  massive devaluation  and dismantling  repression and inflation  sector loans were replaced by converting  into
of protectionist barriers reduced corporate  tax.  equity govemment  loans or other claims:
sector's ability to repay its debt.  *  injection of additional capital where
necessary to meet prudential framework;
Guinea  . bank loans granted on basis of  . 6 banks accounting  for  *  repayment ot'deposits  . 6 public banks were liquidated while the
1985  developmcnt  plan;  99% of total system  amounted to 3% of 1986  only bank in private ownership was allowed to
a  insolvent state and private sector  deposits.  GDP.  stay in market with promise of foreign
enterprises;  shareholders to inject new capital;
*  gross mismanagement,  fraud and  *  govemment  offered generous  incentive
irregularities in banks, deficient bank  packages in order to overcome foreign banks
management, lack of intemal controls  reluctance to come  into Guinea.
serious shortcomings  in regulatory and
accounting framework as well as
inadequate banking supervision;
*  weak functioning ofjudicial  system.
Guinea  . deficient bank management, lack of  *  2 banks  =  22.4% of  . govemment's  restructuring  plan only dealt  7.3, 3.4 (1991-93)
1993/4  intemal controls,  lack of loan monitoring;  financial system assets;  with tsvo  technically insolvent  banks:
*  serious shortcomings  in regulatory and  *  one other in serious  *  on private bank's  past losses were absorbed
accounting framework  as well as  trouble;  by major private shareholder  and govemment;
inadequate banking supervision;  *  3 banks together  =  government  participation in form of
banking sector also suffered from high  45% of market.  subordinated  loan with 3 year maturity:  in event
operating costs;  of insufficient loan recovery,  loan will be
*  weak functioning  ofjudicial  system.  forgiven;
*  other bank's  losses were completely
absorbed by govemment  as negotiations with
foreign shareholder  failed and recapitalized to
fulfill minimum capital standards; was then
placed under interim administration  while long
term solution is sought;Table  2: The Main Characteristics  of the Banking  Crises  23
Kenya  *  ToT shock and drought;  4 banks and 24 non-  restructuring  measures put into place dealt  -7.4,  1.4 (1990-93)
1986-89  e  relaxation  of licensing requirements  bank financial institutions  with institutions accounting  for 2% of banking
resulted  in rapid growth of financial  faced liquidity and  system;
institutions:  solvency problems  *  eight banks and one housing  companies (2%
*  many of new non-bank  financial  together  accounting  for  of financial system assets) were liquidated  and
institutions operated without sufficient  15% of total  liabilities of  their respective assets and liability transferred to
capital base, were subject to less stringent  financial system;  a newly created institution;
controls and were often poorly managed;  *  newly created institution was then
*  political motivated  loans;  recapitalized  by converting  parastatal  deposits
•  inadequate prudential framework and  into equity and an injection of equity  by the
inadequate supervisory  agency which  deposit  insurance fund.
enforcement  capacity was severely  *  in another restructuring  phase, govemment
hindered  by lack of qualified staff and  liquidated 9 institutions  and merged one other
inadequate infornation;  institution with newly created institution;
together  institution accounted for another 2% of
financial system  assets.
Madagascar  a  political interference  *  all 3 public banks  *  about FMG  19 billion  *  3 state-owned banks cleaned portfolios  using  4.3, 1.4 (1985-87)
1984-89  . loans  to SOEs  insolvent,  about 40% of  reserves and interest-free govemment  loans;
*  deficient bank management  loans doubtful or loss  about FMG  12 billion  loans cleared.  2 of the
*  2 banks later partially  banks partially privatized in  1991
privatized
Nigeria  *  large  overhang  of uncollectible  loans:  a  1993: 24 banks  *  so far, 4 banks have seen their licenses  -17.8, 5.6 (1987-89)
1990s  *  political  interference:  insolvent  - 20% of  revoked and 6 public  banks, owned  by state
*  macro instability:  banking  system assets:  government,  have been taken over  by Central
*  deficient bank management,  insider  *  1995: almost  half of  Bank;
lending, fraud, etc.;  banks are reported to be
*  lack of strong regulatoD  and  in distress.
supervisory  enforcement  and lack of
political will;
*  inaction towards  insolvent  banks.Table 2: The Main Characteristics  of the Banking  Crises  24
Senegal  *  deteriorating  Tol,  drought;  *  7 banks were  *  US$ 830 million.  *  6 banks were liquidated; their assets and  -1.9, 4.1 (1985-87)
1988-91  *  inappropriate  financial  sector policies  liquidated  accounting  for  equivalent  to 17%  of GDP.  liabilities  were transferred  to the national
(artificially  low interest  rates, preferential  20 to 30% of financial  recovery  agency;
rates to selected  sectors);  system  assets.  *  2 banks  (all of which  had less than 25% of
*  a lack  of fiscal discipline;  govemment  ownership)  wvere  restructured  and
*  virtual absence  of bank supervision:  recapitalized:  another  banks  was recapitalized
*  banks  plagued by poor management.  with financial  contributions  from shareholders,
govemment interference,  and lack of  the BCEAO,  and the Govemment;
intemal  controls  on lending decisions.  . finally,  sound assets  of one other banks
were separated  out and used to create a new
bank.
Indonesia  *  boom and bust cycle; liberalization  of  *  classified  assets equal  *  resolution cost for  *  preferred  resolution  mechanism  for private  30.9, 7.2 (1989-1991)
1992-94  banking  sector followed  by credit growth;  to over 14% of banking  private banks: NA;  banks  are to either merge insolvent  institution
tight monetary  policy adopted in 1990/1  system  assets  with over  *  recapitalization  cost of  with  healthy bank providing  new entity with
resulted  in sharp rise in real interest rates  70% in the state banks.  five public banks expected  Central  Bank assistance  or to extend  soft loans;
that caused many borrowers  to default  on  to amount  to US $ 2.7 bn  *  one bank was liquidated;
their loans;  or 1.8%/o  in 1993  GDP.  *  five state commercial banks were
*  deregulation  of banking  sector began 5  recapitalized  by turning  liquidity credit into
years before  improvements  in supervision  equity;
were made and 8 years before  capital  a  in general,  Central Banks  tries to avoid  to
requirements  raised;  liquidate  banks  because of legal difficulties  (no
lending  to related parties;  bankruptcy  code).
•  deficiencies  in bank management  and
lack of intemal controls;
a  public bank problems  attributed  to
political loans/connected  lending/
fraudulent  loans  and bad credit decisions.Table 2: The Main Characteristics of the Banking Crises  25
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Malaysia  *  economic  recession brought on by a  *  24 DITCs  3.3% of  *  reported losses  *  commercial  banking sector: high  interest  13.8  6.7 (1982-84)
1985-88  sharp decline in commodity prices  financial  system deposits;  equivalent  to 4.7% of GNP  rates spread;
worldwide;  and  *  depositors  of DTCs  *  in case of 4 marginally solvent commercial
*  sharp  fall in asset prices (bursting  of  *  4  insolvent banks  =  exposed to possible  losses.  banks existing  shareholders were required to
bubble);  4.4% of financial system  in ject new capital  through rights issue while
a  weak export and poor domestic demand  deposits.  Central Bank supplemented  proceeds with
lead to large financial losses for  enough capital  to meet minimum capital
corporations  which in tum reduced their  adequacy requirements;
ability to service their debt;  *  Deposit Taking Cooperatives  sector:  II  with
shortcomings  in regulatory  and accounting  relatively small capital  deficiencies  received
framework  for Deposit Taking  loans at concessional  rates and were taken  over
Cooperatives  sector as well as inadequate  by appointed bank or finance company  (f. c.); 12
supervision  for DTC sector.  DTCs with moderate to heavy losses were
absorbed  into one singlelicensed  f. c.;  I large
DTC was taken over by a publicly  listed
company  and its finance company  subsidiary.
Philippines  *  increase  in oil prices and intemational  . 2 public banks (50%  . at its peak. central bank  *  Central Bank provided liquidity  loans to  10.21. 5.66 (1978-80)
1981-87  interest rates. coupled  with deterioration  of  of banking  system assets)  assistance amounted to  ailing banks under oversight of central bank
ToT; extemal  debt crisis and recession;  *  6 private banks (12%  19.1 billion pesos or 3% of  conservator;
*  lending to related parties and politically  of banking system assets):  GDP;  *  unviable and insolvent  institutions wkere
motivated  loans;  *  32 thrifts equivalent  to  *  depositors  bore losses  liquidated  and depositors paid off;
shortcomings  in regulatory  and accounting  53.2% of thrift banking  equivalent  to 5.2% of total  *  during crisis, authorities arranged  for
framework  as well as inadequate  banking  assets;  deposits  or 0.6% of GNP in  govemment  financial  institutions to take over 6
supervision;  *  and  128 rural banks.  1987.  private commercial banks; 2 government  banks
*  deficient  bank management,  lack of  that together  accounted for 50% of banking
intemal  controls, high operating  costs, and  assets transferred their non-performing  assets to
exchange  rate losses.  a government  recovery agency; government  then
recapitalized banks and assumed deposit
liabilities equal in amount to book value of non-
performing assets transferred minus capital
infusion;
*  all in all between  1981 and mid  1987, 3
commercial  banks.  128 rural banks. and 32 thrift
institutions failed:Table  2: The Main Characteristics of the Banking Crises  26
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Thailand  *  oil shock in 1979/80  led to sharp  *  financial institutions.  *  government  cost for 50  *  24 finance  companies  vsere  closed.  3.6. 5.3(1980-82)
1983-87  decline in growth in early 19XOs  and  intervened in. accounted  finance  companies  *  9 finance  companies  were merged  into 2 nexs
devaluation  of exchange  rate,  tight  for 25% of all financial  estimated  at 0.5% of GNP;  companies:
monetary policy and high international  system assets:  *  government  cost for  *  for commercial  banks:  creation  of joint
interest rates  reduced  corporate  sector's  *  3 commercial  banks  subsidized  loans amounted  goverment/commercial hank "lifeboat fund to
ability to service its debt;  considered  to he insol-  to about 0.2% of GDP  provide liquidity, emergency  loans and soft
*  deficient bank management,  lack of  vent accounted  for 14.1%  annually:  capital; participating institutions were required
internal control and fraud & real estate  and  of commercial bank  *  depositors  of finance  to inject new  capital or surrender  25% of their
exchange  rate  transactions;  assets.  companies  bore  shares  to government  to be res. d to original
*  shortcomings  in regulatory and  approximately up to 50%  owners  at predetermined  rates  within five years.
accounting  framnework  as  xvell  as  of losses  in real terms.  *  finance  and securities  companies:  also
inadequate  supervision,  creation  of lifeboat fund; participating
institutions had to fulfill  certain conditions to
join scheme;
*  13 finance  and 8 commercial  banks received
support  including financial subsidies  in form of
soft loans.
Argentina  *  high  real  interest  rates,  overvaluation of  *  1980-83: 72  *  55.3% ofGiDP.  *  betweenl1980-821liquidation  was  main  20.2. 3.4 (1977-79)
1980-82  the exchange  rate, and higher real wages  institutions wsere  failure resolution device: 72 institutions were
reduced  private enterprise  sector's ability  liquidated,  liquidated;
to service its debt;  *  in 1982.  central bank put in place  measures
*  liberalization of financial sector  without  to assist  insolvent borrowers  and banks  by
adequate  strengthening  of regulatory  followving  tvo  basic  policies: it sub,jected  interest
framework and  bank supervision;  rates  to a  ceiling that permitted banks to reducee
weak hank supervision  and enforcement  interest rates  to borrowers  to manageable  levels,
was coupled with 100%  state  guarantee  on  and it increased  reserve  requirements  that, in
hank  deposits  which  led  to moral  hazard.  turn,  provided central  bank with resources  to
lend to most troubled institutions:
*  furhermore, interest rate controls produced
negative  real interest  rates  transferring  wealth
from depositors  to borrowers.Table  2: The Main Characteristics  of the Banking  Crises  27
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Argentina  *  public sector debt distress  coupled  with  *  all banks or 50% of  *  conversion  of time  *  implementation  of BONEX  plan that forced  8.8, 2.7 (1986-88)
1989-90  loss of access  to intemational  credit  deposits.  deposits into  government  conversion  of virtually all domestic  commercial
markets;  bonds imposed losses on  bank 7-day time deposits in private  and public
*  immediate  trigger  of 1989  crisis was  time  deposit holders,  since  banks into a combination  of cash  (up to
government's  decision  to free foreign  Bonex bonds traded  equivalent  of Us $ 500) and US $ 3.5 billion of
exchange  market  and remove  all price  inm:nediatelv  at a 2/3  BONES  (extemal) govemment  bonds;  dollar
controls  which provoked  a sudden price  discount and did not carry  denominated  bonds had a maturity of 10  years,
increase  and led to bank deposit  any interest for 24 months.  carried  a 2 year grace period,  and paid interest  of
withdrawals.  LIBOR  plus small spread:
*  technically  conversion worked  as follows:
treasury  purchased  commercial  banks' voluntary
holdings  of seven day interest bearing  central
bank and treasury  obligations  in return for
BONEX  bonds: these were then used by banks
too make the conversion.
Argentina  *  crisis  unfolded  with December  20.  *  suspension  of eight  *  N/A  *  Central Bank provided  liquidity  assistance  16.7.  7.4 (1992-94)
1995  1994,  devaluation  in Mexico  which  was  banks and collapse of  through  different  mechanism:
followed  by a withdrawal  of foreign  three banks.  *  implementation  of Deposit Insurance
investors from Latin  American  countries;  Scheme in April 1995  to boost confidence  in
events weakened  position  of wholesale  financial  sector:
banks  that had significant  inventories  of
government  securities  on which  they were
incurring  capital  losses due to the increase
in interest  rates:
- crisis uncovered  inefficiencies  in the
Argentine  banking system  which is in
period  of consolidation;
*  non-financial  firms affected  by
downturn.Table 2: The Main Characteristics of the Banking Crises  28
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Brazil  *  dissipation  of inflation  tax  wvhich  *  Banespa  with assets  of  *  estimate:  negative  net  . 2 big state  banks  - Banespa,  Banerj  - that  6.3,  1.2  (1991-93)
1994  brought  weaknesses  (high  operating  costs.  R 17.5  billion of assets  worth  of selected  state  and  account  for roughly  20%  of financial  system
poor  portfolio,  excessive  loan  equivalent  to  5%  of total  federal  banks  5- 10%  of  assets  were  taken  over  by Central  Bank;  as  well
concentration)  in public  banking  system  to  banking  assets;  GDP.  as  Banco  Economico  and  4 other  smaller  banks
surface;  *  Banerj  with assets  of R  that  account  for 1-2%  of financial  system  assets;
*  deficiencies  in regulatory  and  2.7  billion;  *  plan  for Banespan  is to  recapitalize  bank
accounting  framework  as  well  as  *  both banks  account  with state  and  federal  funds;  exercise  will cost
inadequate  bank  supervision  in public  for  roughly  20%  of  about  US  $ 7.5  bn or 1%  of GDP;  however,  plan
banking  system;  financial  system  assets;  still needs  to  be  approved  by  respective  state  and
*  directed  credit  programs  and  lending  to  *  Banco  Economico  federal  parliament:
SOEs.  *  4 smaller  banks.  *  unclear  at  this  moment  whether  and  how
state  and  federal  government  will share  in cost
for  recapitalizing  bank;  in the  meantime,
management  consultancy  group  has  taken  over
management  of bank  and  has  been  streamlining
its  operation  by letting  go off people  and
shutting  down  branches:
*  2 of the  smaller  private  banks  were
liquidated:  Banco  Economico  will most  probably
be  recapitalized  with government  funds.
Chile  *  high levels  of domestic  and  *  1983:7  banks& I  *  total  costs  estimated  at  *  tvo successive  waves  of government  41.6. 8.1  (1978-80)
1981-83  international  interest  rates  reduced  financiera  accounting  for  41.2%  of GDP;  (average  of  interventions:  November  1981  and  January
corporate  sector's  ability to  repay  debt;  45%  of total  assets.  10.3%  of  GDP  from 1982-  1983;
*  deterioration  of ToT due  to a  sharp  85).  *  1981-1982:  authorities  considered  banking
decline  in the  price  of copper;  problems  as  temporary;  measures  were  adopted
*  overvalued  exchange  rate  coupled  with  providing  institutions  with increased  accounting
wage  rigidity:  flexibility to  reflect  their  losses:
*  speculation  in shares  and  properties  and  *  end  of 1982:  change  of policy  towards
the  bursting  of the  bubble;  efforts  to recognize  and  allocate  losses:
inadequate  strengthening  of regulatory  and  *  recapitalization  efforts  involved  direct
accounting  framewvork  and  banking  purchase  of substandard  loans  from  the  portfolio
supervision.  of banks  with repurchase  agreement  at  face
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Colombia  *  loan concentration and fraud;  *  crisis affected  institu-  *  rough estimate:  5%of  *  one small bank (accounting  for 2.3% of all  10.9,  3.9(1979-81)
1982-87  *  financial system  liberalization without  tions that controlled 25%  GDP.  banking system assets was liquidated:
strengthening  of regulatory and accounting  of banking system assets.  *  5 banks were nationalized  accounting  for
framework  as well as bank supervision;  roughly 23% of financial system assets.
*  deficient bank management.
*  overvaluation  of currency, excessive
private external borrowing, indebtedness
and mismatched exchange  risk;
*  private  sector also hurt by sharp
slowdown in growth.
Uruguay  a  fall in beef prices (main export),  *  affected institutions  =  *  estimated at $350  *  2 banks were liquidated;  21.6, 5.8 (1978-80)
1981-84  collapse of real estate boom, and reduced  30% of financial system  million or 7% of GNP;  *  7 banks, among them the largest private
Argentine  demand coupled  with steep  deposits;  *  Central Bank's  quasi-  bank were taken  over by govemment  owned
rising real interest rates reduced  highly  *  insolvent  banks = 20%  fiscal losses associated wvith  banks;  as a result, 75% of deposits  ended in
leveraged  corporate  sector's abilitv to  of financial system dep..  subsidized credit  govemment  owned banks;
service its debt:  operations  and purchase of  *  5 banks were taken over  by foreign banks
deficient bank management:  loan portfolios amounted to  with the Central Bank buying  the bad loan
*  shortcomings  in regulatorv and  24.2% of GDP during  1982  portfolio of these banks in exchange  for bonds
accounting  framework and inadequate  to  1985.  and promissory  notes.
bank supervision.
Venezuela  l  liberalization  of financial system  *  insolvent  banks  *  up to March  1995.  . govemment  provided financial  assistance by  -6.0, 2.8 (1992-93)
1994/95  without adequate strengthening of  accounted for 30% of  govemment  has spent $ 7  state run guarantee  fund to over  15 institutions;
regulatory and accounting framework  as  financial  system deposits.  billion  equivalent  to  13%  a  Banco Latino was reopened after a 313 bn
well as  bank supervision;  of GDP:  bolivar government  bailout.
*  poor lending decisions, deficient  bank  *  total  estimated losses
management;  put at over  18% of GDP.
*  collapse of bolivar;
*  overbanked  system.
United States
1984-91  *  deficient bank management  *  More than  1,400  3-5% of GDP  *  For S&Ls, Resolution  Trust Corporation  1.6, 1.2 (1981-83)
•  inadequate supervision and poor  savings &  loans and  created to resolve all insolvent  thrifts, using
regulation  1.300 banks failed.  govemment  funds and assessments  on remaining
*  macro volatility, regional recessions  thrifts.  Parts of borderline or insolvent  banks
sold off.  Commercial  banks handled  by various
regulators,  relying on mergersTable  2: The Main Characteristics  of the Banking  Crises  30
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Estonia  . implemenitation  nf currenc\ board  *  insolvent banks = 41l0o  *  recapitalization outlays  *  12 banks xxere  liquidated amo)ng  [bent 'I'artu  -41.2. -16.8 (1992-93)
1992  -94  brought orowing bad  debt problemi  Of  some  of banking ssxstenm  assets:  For  new entity 30)0  mill:  Bank)(  accottnting for 15O%  of commercial  bank
hank.s  to surface  which could tno  longer  *  Social bank which  ELKx  or 1  .4°.; of GOP;  assets)  and Social  Bank (at point in time it
eam large  profits from foreign exchange  controlled about bo)o  of'  *  in case  of'social bank.  experienced  problems was  3rd largest  bank);
trading. or by onlending central bank credit  financial sxstett assets.  goxerttmenit  might incur  *  2 other insolvent banks  were merged and
at high spreads:  losses  on not recovering its  news  entity was to be recapitalized:  at the sante
*  d4Siciertt  bank management  and  funds  deposited  at bank:  time frozen assets  and deposits  of two banks
imlpr ropriate  lendiny  polities:  *  some ~depositor  losses  at  vjere  to be moved to Cetntral  Bank and placed  in
I rozen  deposits  in Ruissia;  selected  bantks.  fund known as  Vl.B  fund; former depositors  of
*  collapse  of Social Bank caused  by bad  txxo  banks received  tradeable  certificate of this
loans  and fraud..  fund.
*  in order to restore  public confidetnce  in
banking system.  wholesale  banks x.ere  required
to apply f'or relicensing.
F'inland  *  deregulation  of finiancial sy  stcm  *  sax  ings  bankinig  . recap. costs  amounted  to  *  the Governtnent Guarantee  Fund (GGF) has  1  1.9. 3.5 (1  1988-90)
1991-1993  'aithottt adequate  strengthening  Of  sector  badls af'fected;  8%i of'(Ji)B  sttpported  thte  banking sy^stem  in two ways: (i) a
regulator! and supervisory^  frameonork:  . govertttnent  took  big commercial  bank was acquired  from Central
*  boom and bust  cy  cle:  control of' Skophanik  bank (C. B. had taken  control of bank in 1991.
*  collapse in soviet trade,  deterioration  of  (Apex bank for Finnish  it then  recapitalized  institution and bougbt  its
To1':;  savings  banks) in August  largest  risk exposures):  (ii) GGFE  sttpported  41
*rise  in real interest rates  adverse)>  1991  savhitts  bank that were later  amalgated  to form
affected  repayment  capacit>  of banks'  the Sav  ings Bank of Finlanid  (SBF); this wxas
borrowers;  done  by means  of a capital  injection  and the
*  depreciation  of marka also adversely  gratttinig  of guarantees.
afftected  repayment  capacity of private
sector indebted  in fo)reign  exchange;
*  excessive  risk taking in lending. poor
decisions,  lack of intemnal  eontttols.
Hungary  *  inheritance  of largely non-performing  *  2nd half of 1993:  8  *  cost  of repleated  . government  has implemented  so far4  14.8.  -4.9 (1989-91)
1990s  portfolio from former monobattks;  banks  were fottnd to be  rcapitalization  efforts  differetnt  recapitalization schemes.
*  impact  of recession  of real sector  on  insolvent  =25%-/  of  estimated  at 10%  of (iDP
econonty: demise  of CMEA:  financial sy  stem assets.  so far.
I ack  of bankinig  expertise  and poor
lending policies;
*  moral  hazard  due to repetitive  bank
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Latvia  *  deficient  bank  management  *  affected  banks  *  not  yet  clear  *  Bank Baltija taken over by government.  with  -66.5. -25.5 (1992-93)
1994-  *  inadequate  supervision  and  accounted  for  40%  of  $260 million  in losses as of Julv  1995. 3 other
regulation  total  banking  system  banks in the process of being closed
*  fraud  assets.
Poland  . severe economic  shocks that Polish  *7  of 9 treasurv-owned  *  treasurv-owned  banks:  *  inflation;  -23.8,-2.4 (1988-1990)
1992-94  enterprises suffered  in 1990 and  1991 (e.g.  commercial banks  that  tLS$ 750 millions =%of  *  9 treasurv owned banks: in late 1991, MoF  -21.2. -5.3 (1990-1992)
demise of CMEA  trade):  accounted roughly for  1993 GDP;  required banks to undergo audit from
*  poor lending decisions and lack of  25% of total financial  a  Bank for Food  independent  outside auditors; one bank was
banking expertise.  system assets;  Economy and cooperative  privatized;  seven banks were recapitalized under
*  Bank for Food  banking sector: US $ 900  condition  that their clean up their balance sheet
economy  and cooperative  millions;  or run the risk of losing control to Central Bank;
banking sector accounting  each bank was required to establish a work out
for roughly 20% of  department  and assign special management
financial system assets:  teams to run and monitor portfolios;
*  Bank for Food Economy has been
recapitalized twice but it still insolxent:
*  cooperative banking sector: in  1994. NBP
suspended  activities of 50 cooperative  banks.
and 30 wvere  declared bankrupt.
Spain  . combination  of oil shock 73/74 and  *  banks affected held  . 5.6% of 1985 GDP.  *  3 small institutions were liquidated:  4.4. 2.3 (1974-76)
1977-1985  inappropriate policy responses to shock;  20% of deposits.  . 21 Non-RUMSA banking institutions were
*  rapid liberalization of banking sector  capitalized before they were resold:
without adequate strengthening of  . 20 RUMSA banking institutions were
regulatory and accounting framework as  nationalized and later privatized.
well as bank supervision:
deficient bank management and
concentration of loans to related parties.Table 2: The Main Characteristics of the Banking Crises  32
Turkey  *  79/80 l'urkey slid into a recession  *  5 small banks were  *  restructuring  of 5 banks  *  initially  Central Bank provided liquiditv  3.8, .95 (1979-81)
1982-85  brought on by tight monetary  policy;  closed  down after 1983;  2.5% of GNP;  assistance;
reduced  sharply corporate  sector  s ability  *  2 banks after 1985.  government  bore also  *  later it intervened in five small private
to service  its debt  which in turn adversely  cost  of restructuring  other  banks.  removed  their management  and declared
affected  banks;  two banks.  them  bankrupt; liabilities of 4 banks were
l  liberalization  of banking  system without  transferred  to state  owned banks;  those  of fifth
adequate  strengthening  of regulatory'  and  bank were taken  over by largest  private bank;
accounting  framework and bank  *  a large  development  bank which was  owned
supervision;  by local banks was  recapitalized  by its
lending to related  parties.  shareholders  and received  support from
government  via long-term  loans;
*  another  bank was taken  over  by government
because  current  shareholders  did not recapitalize
it.
Sources: World Bank Financial  Sector Reviews  and Country Economic Memoranda,  interviews with Bank Financial Sector  Specialists.  and: Sheng. 1995;  World Bank, 1990,  p.53: IMF,  1995;
Baer/Klingebiel, 1994;  Vittas, 1992;  V. Sundararajan,  V. Thomas,  J.T. Balino. 1991;  The Banker, 1995;  Jorge  Marshall & K. Schmidt-Hebbel.  1994:  Rodriguez, 1994:  World Bank, 1989: Felipe
Morris/ Mark Dorfman/ Jose  Pedro  Ortiz & Maria Claudio Franco. 1990;  Blass  and Grossman.  1995;  Fleming and Talles. 1996:  The Economist,  1995-96;  Financial  Times. 1995; Boris. Long  . and
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Argentina, 1980-82  -12.08  1975-79  0.07
Argentina, 1989  -10.92  1983-88  0.07
Bangladesh, late 1980s-  -11.20  1975-86  0.07
Bangladesh, late 1980s-  -20.00  1975-87  0.07
Benin, 1988-90  -42.20  1975-87  0.16
Benin, 1988-90  -53.18  1975-88  0.16
Bolivia, 1986-87  -15.66  1975-85  0.39
Bolivia, 1986-87  -38.89  1975-86  0.39
Brazil, 1995 (1990)  -3.54  1975-89  0.07
Bulgaria**, 1990s  8.33  1985-89  0.18
Cameroon, 1987-  -55.86  1975-86  0.28
CAR, 1980s&  1994  -10.64  1975-79  0.22
Chad, 1980s&  1990s  -28.57  1975-79  0.10
Chad, 1980s&  1990s  -15.97  1975-80  0.10
Chile, 1981-83  -9.22  1977-80  0.09
Chile,  1981-83  -21.28  1977-81  0.09
Colombia**. 1982-87  -42.80  1975-81  0.15
Congo, 1980s&  1991  0.89  1975-79  0.29
Congo, 1980s&  1991  37.50  1975-80  0.29
Costa Rica, 1987  -24.69  1975-86  0.11
Costa Rica, 1987  -38.27  1975-87  0.11
Cote d'lvoire, 1988-91  -39.76  1975-87  0.20
Cote d'lvoire, 1988-91  -46.39  1975-88  0.20
Ecuador, early 1980s  15.60  1975-80  0.29
Egypt, 1990-92  -38.71  1984-89  0.26
Egypt, early 1980s,  -17.73  1975-79  0.26
Egypt, early 1980s,  11.35  1975-80  0.26
Finland,  1991  -1.89  1975-90  0.09
Ghana**  1982-89  -53.62  1975-81  0.24
Ghana**  1982-89  -59.59  1975-82  0.24
Ghana**, 1995  9.90  1990-93  0.24
Guinea 1985, 1994-95  -24.55  1975-84  0.19
Hungary, 1991-95  -11.76  1975-89  0.05
India, 1994-95  -8.00  1975-92  0.23
Japan**, 1990s  -4.50  1975-89  0.22
Kenya**, 1985-89  -39.03  1975-84  0.16
Kenya**. 1985-89  -49.19  1975-85  0.16
Kenya**, 1992, 1993-96  14.80  1990-91  0.16
Kuwait, 1980s  6.67  1975-79  0.37
Kuwait, 1  980s  53.33  1975-80  0.37
Madagascar, 1988  -33.33  1975-87  0.14
Madagascar, 1988  -27.33  1975-88  0.14
Mauritania, 1984  -24.11  1975-83  0.08
Mauritania, 1988-94  -15.97  1985-87  0.08
Mauritania, 1988-94  -25.21  1985-88  0.08
Mexico, 1981-91  -4.86  1975-80  0.14
Mexico, 1981-91  1.39  1975-81  0.14
Morocco, early 1980s  -31.03  1975-80  0.07
Mozambique, 1987-  -20.09  1975-86  0.07
Nepal,  1988  -27.54  1975-87  0.05
Nigeria, 1990s  -58.33  1975-89  0.39
Nigeria, 1990s  -49.51  1975-90  0.39
Norway**, 1987-89  -26.62  1975-86  0.16
Philippines, 1981-87  -11.30  1975-80  0.07
Philippines, 1981-87  -20.87  1975-81  0.07
Poland**, 1990s  16.55  1975-89  0.07
Poland**, 1990s  0.30  1975-90  0.07
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Senegal, 1988-91  -20.63  1975-87  0.05
Spain**,  1977-85  1.16  1975-79  0.15
Spain*,  1977-85  -11.58  1975-80  0.15
Sri Lanka,  1989-93  -40.72  1975-88  0.11
Sweden**, 1991-  0.00  1975-90  0.06
Taiwan**. 1983-84  -15.38  1975-82  0.12
TFanzania.  1987,  1995  -26.1I1  1975-86  0.14
Tanzania.  1987,  1995  -36.31  1975-87  0.14
Thailand, 1983-87  -33.10  1975-82  0.09
Toga, 1993-  -52.36  1975-92  0.13
Turkey, 1982-85  -25.00  1975-81  0.13
Turkey, 1994  -2.63  1986-92  0.13
Uganda,  1994  -86.79  1975-92  0.40
Uruguay, 1981-84  -18.25  1975-80  0.05
Venezuela**, 1980  22.04  1975-79  0.27
Venezuela**, 1994-95  -35.56  1981-93  0.27
Zaire  -34.01  1975-90  0.12
Australia**. 1989-90  -24.22  1975-88  0.07
France**, 1994-95  2.97  1975-93  0.07
Germany"*, 1989  0.00  1980-88  0.09
Germany**, late  1970's  -4.50  1975-76  0.09
Hong Kong, 1982-83  -15.45  1975-81  0.03
Indonesia.  1994  -39.07  1975-92  0.21
Malaysia. 1985-88  -5.93  1975-84  0.14
Malaysia, 1985-88  -13.33  1975-85  0.14
New Zealand**, 1987-90  -16.24  1975-86  0.08
New Zealand**, 1987-90  -7.05  1975-87  0.08
Singapore*,* 1982  2.09  1979-81  0.06
USA**,  1981-91  -18.07  1975-80  0.05
OECD
Austria  No crisis  0.06
Belguiun  No crisis  0.05
Canada"  No crisis  0.04
Denmark**  No crisis  0.05
Greece  No crisis  0.03
Iceland  No crisis  0.04
Ireland**  No crisis  0.04
Italy  No crisis  0.11
Netherlands**  No crisis  0.02
Portugal  No crisis  0.10
Source:  using latest  available  data
World Tables
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ARGENTINA  6.6  1993  Vegetable products  20.6 Food products  17.2 Live animals  9.7 Minerals  9.5
ARGENTINA  1988  Animal Feed  14.9 Veg. oil  8.7 Wheat  5.4 Meat  4.5
ARGENTINA  1985  Wheat  12.7 Oil seeds  10.2 Veg. oil  10.1 Maize  9.2
ARGENTINA  1980  Wheat  10.2 Meat  8.6 Oil seeds  8.3 Maize  6.4
ARGENTINA  1979  Maize  9.2 Oil seeds  8.8 Meat  8.4 Cereals  6.6
BANGLADESH  10.4  1994  Clothing  60.0 Fisheries  10.8 lute products  10.2 Leather  6.7
BANGLADESH  1982  Textiles  24.3 Woven textiles  18.6 Jute  14.9 Fish  8.4
BENIN  23.4  1985  Cotton  31.5 Cocoa  26.8 Veg. oil  8.3 Coffee  7.1
BOLIVIA  1982  Metals  31.9 Natural gas  27.4 Tin  22.3 Wood  3.2
BRAZIL  10.0  1994  Metallurgical prod.  13.9 Transport equip.  9.7 Soya products  7.1 Chemical prod.  5.9
BRAZIL  1993  Metallurgical prod.  15.8 Transport equip.  10.9 Soya products  8.0 Chemical prod.  6.7
BRAZIL  1990  Coffee  8.4 Iron  7.2 Animal feed  5.6 Footwear  4.2
BULGARIA  48.9  1994  Min., fuels & chem.  26.2 Agric. & food prod.  21.9 Metals & ores  19.7 Textiles  14.0
CAMEROON  20.0  1994  Crude Petro.  54.3 Cocoa  6.3 Coffee  5.0 Cotton  4.3
CAMEROON  1982  Crude Petro.  46.8 Coffee  15.6 Cocoa  14.2 Wood  4.4
CAR  12.4  1994  Diamonds  47.3 Timber  5.3
CAR  1990  Perals  49.0 Coffee  18.6 Cotton  6.9 Wood  6.7
CAR  1980  Coffee  28.4 Pearl  26.0  Wood  24.6 Cotton  7.8
CHAD  17.2  1994  Cotton  35.0 Coffee  Timber  Mining (diamonds)
CHAD  1982  Cotton  79.6 Cotton woven  17.2 Animal feed  2.8
CHAD  1980  Live animals  60.9 Cotton  35.6 Meat  1.9 Fish  1.6
CHILE  30.9  1994  Mining products  44.8 Industrial prod.  44.1 Agri. & fishing  10.6
of which Copper  36.6
CHILE  1980  Copper  45.7 Plastic  5.3 Animal feed  5.1 Metal  4.8
COLOMBIA  19.3  1994  Coffee  24.6 Oil & derivatives  13.7 Coal  6.3 Flowers  5.0
COLOMBIA  1981  Coffee  49.5 Fruit  4.3 Clothing  4.0 Veg.  3.8
COLOMBIA  1980  Coffee  60.1 Sugar  4.9 Clothing  3.0 Petro. prod.  2.6
CONGO  36.9  1989  Crude Petro.  72.7 Wood  10.0 Pearls  4.7 Plywood  2.6
COSTA RICA  39.2  1982  Fruit  28.0 Coffee  27.6 Meat  6.1 Medicinal prod.  3.2
COTE D'IVOIRE  33.6  1994  Cocoa beans  30.5 Timber  10.4 Coffee & products  6.9 Canned fish  4.0
COTE D'IVOIRE  1987  Cocoa beans  35.6 Coffee  18.8 Fruit  8.3 Wood  7.4
ECUADOR  31.0  1980  Crude Petro.  49.2 Coffee  13.1 Cocoa  13.0 Fruit  7.5
EGYPT  26.8  1989  Crude Petro.  21.4 Textiles  17.6 Aluminium  11.0 Cotton  9.3
EGYPT  1980  Crude Petro.  57.8 Cotton  14.6 Textiles  6.4 Petro prod.  6.4
ERITREA  8.0  1989  Coffee  61.5 Hides  13.2 Live Animals  3.3 Veg.  3.3
(ETHIOPIA)
A~~''^  1992  Textiles  13.8 Base Metals  13.1 Minerals & Electricity  11.2 Live animals  10.2Table 4: Major Bank Insolvencies- Trade Concentration, Exports year prior to crisis  36
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ESTONIA  1990  Machinery  28.3 Food Prod.  16.0 Light industry  15.4 Chemicals  12.1
GHANA  16.0  1994  Gold  45.0 Cocoa beans  25.0 Timber  13.5
GHANA  1985  Cocoa  66.1 Aluminium  5.7 Fish  4.0 Wood & prod.  3.8
GHANA  1980  Cocoa  73.7 Aluminium  18.3 Metal  1.9
GUINEA  13.8  1992  Mining  89.7 Coffee  6.6 Cocoa  1.4
GUINEA  1989  Mining  90.9 Coffee  3.8 Cocoa  1.1 Gold  0.8
HONG KONG  143.8  1989  Outervear  24.8 Watches  7.5 Telecom equip.  5.2 Toys  3.9
HONG KONG  1980  Clothing  32.7 Watches  9.2 Toys  8.8 Telecom. equip.  6.7
HUNGARY  33.3  1994  Raw materials  30.1 Consumer goods  21.1 Food products  17.6 Capital equip.  11.6
HUNGARY  1989  Buses  3.4 Steel  3.0 Meat  2.9 Oil products  2.6
INDIA  9.9  1990  Pearls  18.7 Women's clothing  5.2 Cotton fabrics  3.7 Leather  3.6
JAPAN  10.2  1990  Cars  15.1 Telecom equip.  5.6 Computers  4.2 Transistors  4.2
KENYA  26.8  1989  Coffee  23.8 Tea  22.7  Petro. prod.  12.1 Veg. materials  4.9
KENYA  1982  Petro.  27.4 Coffee  26.5 Tea  14.2 Cement  3.7
KUWAIT  35.8  1982  Crude petro.  73.1 Petro prod.  18.5 Gas  4.8
LATVIA  35.2  1994  Wood  21.3 Textiles  13.2 Foodstuffs  12.8 Metals  10.1
MADAGASCAR  16.7  1985  Coffee  39.1 Spices  28.5 Fish  7.3 Cotton fabrics  3.8
MAURITANIA  38.8  1989  Frozen Shellfish  42.9  Iron ore  39.0 Fish  10.1 Petro. prod.  3.5
MEXICO  12.6  1990  Crude Petro  38.4 Engines  6.9 Buses  6.5 Coffee  2.6
MEXICO  1980  Crude Petro  61.6 Gas  3.3 Coffee  2.9 Petro prod.  2.8
MOROCCO  22.6  1980  Fertilizer  31.2 Fruit  12.3 Inorganic elements  8.2 Metal  5.7
MOZAMBIQUE  28.9  1982  Maize  17.9 Sugar  17.3 Fruit  12.4 Iron  8.8
NEPAL  19.5  1985  Rugs  14.5 Clothing  12.1 Rice  7.4 Veg.  6.5
NIGERIA  39.1  1994  Crude Petro.  87.5 Cocoa beans  7.5 Rubber  3.8
NIGERIA  1989  Crude Petro.  91.5 Cocoa beans  3.1 Petro. products  1.1 Rubber  0.8
NORWAY  43.2  1982  Crude Petro.  28.2 Gas  19.2 Ships  7.1 Aluminium  4.4
PARAGUAY  22.2  1990  Coton  36.0 Seeds  33.0 Meat  5.5 Animal feed  4.8
PHILIPPINES  29.0  1994  Electrical equip.  26.4 Garments  16.9 Copper  2.8 Coconut oil  2.7
PHILIPPINES  1980  Metals  15.7 Sugar  11.7 Veg. oil  9.8 Clothing  4.9
POLAND  19.9  1994  Machinery & equip  23.6 Chemicals  11.8 Food  9.5 Coal  6.8
POLAND  1991  Coal  6.7 Copper  4.6 Ships  2.3 Iron  2.3
RUSSIA  28.1  1993  Oil & gas  50.0 Minerals & metal  20.0 Machinery  7.0 Chem. prod.  6.0
SENEGAL  22.6  1985  Fish  14.4 Veg. oil  13.4 Fertilizer  11.6 Canned Fish  11.6
SLOVENIA  59.7
SPAIN  17.6  1994  Raw materials  34.5 Consumer dur.  16.3 Capital goods  11.4 Foodstuffs  10.8
SPAIN  1976-77  Motor Vech.  8.8 Fruit  5.2 Footwear  4.7 Iron & Steel  4.4
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TANZANIA  21.1  1987  Coffee  26.1 Cotton  23.8 Manf.  19.0 Minerals  4.3
THAILAND  35.7  1994  Textiles & garments  10.1 Comp. & parts  5.5 Elect. appliances  5.0 Precious stones  3.9
THAILAND  1990  Rice  8.2 Rubber  6.8 Veg.  6.1 Fish  5.0
THAILAND  1982  Rice  17.7 Veg.  11.5 Rubber  7.3 Sugar& Honey  6.9
THAILAND  1980  Rice  15.0 Veg.  11.7 Rubber  9.5 Tin  8.7
TOGO  32.4  1990  Fertilizer  47.8 Cotton  14.6 Coffee  10.9 Cocoa  10.2
TURKEY  20.8  1994  Clothing  25.4 Iron & steel  12.8 Textiles & carpets  4.7 Synthetic fibers  3.8
TURKEY  1980  Fruit  18.0 Cotton  11.3 Tobacco  8.0 Textiles  6.9
UGANDA  6.4  1989  Coffee  96.1 Cotton  1.3 Tea  1.0 Fruit  0.3
URUGUAY  21.5  1994  Meat & products  25.6 Textiles  20.4 Processed rice  7.9 Hides  7.0
URUGUAY  1980  Wool  20.9 Meat  17.2 Clothing  6.9 Rice  6.1
VENEZUELA  1993  Petroleum & prods.  90.5 Aluminium  4.3 Iron ore  2.1 Steel  2.0
VENEZUELA  1990  Petroleum  51.4 Petro. prod.  32.5 Aluminium  6.3 Gold  1.2
VENEZUELA  1980  Petroleum  63.0 Petro. prod.  28.6 Aluminium  2.1 Iron ore  1.5
ZAIRE  21.6  1989  Copper  38.1 Coffee  15.2 Crude petro.  12.7
AUSTRALIA  18.7  1994  Metals & Minerals  21.4 Coal & Petroleum  17.6 Gold  9.0 Wool  8.8
AUSTRALIA  1985  Coal  15.9 Wheat  9.4 Wool  8.3 Iron ore  6.4
FRANCE  23.1  1990  Cars  6.0 Motor veh. parts  4.0 Alcoholic bev.  3.2 Aircraft  2.5
GERMANY  33.5  1985  Cars  15.3 Machines  8.0 Organic chem.  3.6 Plastic  3.4
INDONESIA  29.3  1994  Crude oil & prod.  15.5 Textiles  15.3 Wood & prod.  14.1 Natural gas  9.4
INDONESIA  1991  Crude oil & prod.  27.8 Gas  13.2 Plywood  10.8 Textiles  6.7
MALAYSIA  78.4  1994  Electronics  51.3 Petroleum & LNG  6.0 Palm oil  5.6 Logs&  timber  4.6
MALAYSIA  1984  Crude Petro  23.3 Veg. oil  12.8 Electronics  12.6 Rubber  10.3
NEW ZEALAND  30.8  1982  Meat  23.5 Wool  13.2 Butter  9.8 Milk  6.7
SINGAPORE  173.5  1986  Machinery  38.6 Min. fuels  20.7 Manf. goods  7.4 Chem.  5.8
TAIWAN  1983  Crops  47.5 Livestock  30.0 Fisheries  21.0 Forestry  1.5
UNITED STATES  10.6  1980  Cars  6.7 Machines  6.0 Aircraft  6.0 Maize  4.0
AUSTRIA  39.6  1994  Machinery  Inter. Manf.  Consumer Goods  Chem. products
CANADA  26.7  1994  Motor Veh. & parts  35.4 Mach. & Equip.  26.3  Other indust. prod.  23.8 Forest products  13.9
LUXEMBOURG  89.1  1994  Machinery  Chemicals  Metals  Food
Source: 1994 data was obtained from the Economist Intelligence Unit, all other years obtained from UNCTAD- Handbook of Inter. Trade
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Benin  *  during 1989-91.  *  regulatory  framework:  *  hanks fall under  *  NA  *  yes  *  set up of  *  yes;
1988-90  government  implemented  introduction  of new prudential  supranational  regional  Recovery  Trust  *  two of the bank
financial  and economic  ratios: a risk-weighted  capital-  banking  commission  Fund;  managers  went to
reforms  aimed  at mitigating  to-asset ratio (initially  set at 4%.  established  in 1990;  *  until July 1995,  prison.
extemal and internal  to be raised to 8%),  minimum  *  commission  has  full  recovered  17 bn
imbalances;  ratio of 75% of long-term  responsibility  to undertake  CFA or 15.4%;
*  program  encompassed  resources  to long-term  credit,  off- and on-site  *  debt recovery  is
reform  of the current  budget,  loans and commitment  to one  supervision,  power to  hampered  by legal
general  public sector  single borrower  limited to 100%  issue  cease and desist  environment.
management  and public  of a bank's capital  base,  orders,  remove
enterprise  sector reform;  minimum  liquidity  ratio set at  management  and
despite  implementation  60%;  withdraw  bank's license  to
problems,  macro environment  *  accounting  framework:  NA.  operate.
relatively  favorable  today.
C6te  d'Ivoire  *  in aftermath,  pursuit of  *  also member  of BCEAO  *  also member  of  *  no  *  not clear;  *  set up of a  *  yes
1988-91  tight fiscal and monetary  therefore,  see Benin.  BCEAO  therefore,  see  *  some  Recovery  Trust
policy;  Benin.  rescheduling  of  Fund;
*  devaluation  of currency  short term  debt  *  but recoveries
(CFA  franc).  into long term  were disappointing
loans.  and hampered  by
deficient  legal
environment  for
enforcement  of loan
contracts.
Ghana  *  since 1992,  *  yes  *  yes.  *  yes; yearly  *  NA  *  yes (NPART)  *  some  changes  in
1982-89  macroeconomic  control has  audits by extemal  *  banks: NA  bank management
been slipping  with monetary  auditors.  were made;
and fiscal  control problems.  *  twinning
arrangement  with
foreign  experts.
Guinea  *  large  devaluation  of  *  some changes  made but  *  yes, but unsuccessful  *  no  *  NA  *  first five years  *  banks were
1985  Guinean  currency;  successful  major deficiencies  not  (connected  lending).  after closure  3% of  liquidated;
in bringing down inflation  but  addressed.  loan  portfolio  was  *  no information
less so in cutting  budget  recov..  what happened  to
deficit  (still running  at 7 - 8%  senior  managers.
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Guinea  *  successful  in bringing  *  some changes  were made but  *  yes, but still not  *  NA  *  NA;  *  poor legal  *  yes
1994-95  down  government  deficit  still inefficient.  adequate  supervising  publishing  of  framework  proved
moderately.  banks  and enforcing  central registry  to be a hindrance  in
regulations.  of defaulting  recovery of loans.
borrowers.
Kenya  *  government  embarked  on  *  the revision  of the Banking  *  new reporting  formats  *  yes  *  yes in case  *  yes in case of  *  yes;
1985-1989  major stabilization  and  Act in 1989  reporting,  audit and  and revised  examination  of consolidated  consolidated  bank  *  15% of
adjustment  program  in late  loan loss provisioning  procedures  were  bank;  for the first 2 years;  management  was
1986  to correct  renewed  requiremcnts,  the stipulation  of  developed,  a computerized  *  no in case  *  no in case of  later rehired  after
macro-imbalances  resulting  capital adequacy  requirements  off-site surveillance  data  of other banks  other banks.  examination  process
from loss of fiscal discipline  and exposure limits;  system  was installed  and  in system.  showed that they
and adverse  external  *  however,  new Banking  Act  the frequency  of on-site  were neither  involved
developments;  also included  a provision  under  supervision  examinations  in fraudulent
*  however,  during  the early  which Central  Bank could grant  was increased;  activities nor
1990s,  increases  in public  exemptions  from prudential  *  however,  central bank  responsible  for
sector employment  pushed up  framework.  was not willing to enforce  mismanagement  in
budget deficit  and monetary  regulatory  framework;  former banks.
expansion  fueled inflation;
*  moreover,  with declining
terms  of trade and slow
growth in non-traditional
exports,  the current account
deficit remained  high;
Madapscar  *  1988  Banking  Act covered  *  off-site  supervision  *  no  *  no  *  none, but not  *  yes, some
1984-89  capital, entry,  single borrower  capacity improved;  very effective;  managers  lost their
exposure,  though capital  *  still no on-site  better collection  jobs
requirement  not risk-weighted,  supervision  from losses in the
weak provisioning  policy, and  mid-1990s
no general  accounting
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Senegal  *  in the aftermath  of the  *  member of BCEAO,  *  member  of BCEAO,  *  no  *  yes  *  set up of  *  yes
1988-1991  crisis,  government  therefore  see Benin.  therefore see Benin.  Recovety  Trust
implemented  structural  Fund;
adjustment  program;  *  recoveries  were
*  however,  country  disappointing  and
experienced  some serious  hampered  by
setbacks  with fiscal policy  deficient  legal
expanding  precipitously;  environment  for
*  CFA franc was only  enforcement  of loan
devalued  in 1994.  contracts.
Nigeria  *NA  no  *  no  *  no  NA  *  NA (mostly  'no
1990-  *  government
arrears).
Indonesia  *  government  pursued tight  *  yes  *  yes, but skilled  *  NA  *  yes  *  yes, but  *  yes, heads of
1992-94  fiscal policy in the aftermath  supervisors  in short  inadequate  banks were removed
of crisis;  supply; imposition  of  bankruptcy  laws  but not senior
*  government  loosened  sanctions  politically  limit  ability of  management
monetary  policy in the  difficult.  banks  to act against
immediate  aftermath  of the  delinquent  debtors.
crisis  and then tightened
again.
Malaysia  *  tight fiscal policy and  *  regulatory  framework:  *  on-site supervision:  *  NA;  *  yes  *  yes  *  yes
1985-88  accommodative  monetary  *  introduction  of minimum  improved  reporting  to
policy.  adequacy  requirements,  single  central bank, includes  size
exposure limit  of 30'/! of bank  of NPLs, exposure  to
equity,  prohibition  of lending  to  share and property
directors  and staff of banks  and  financing,  loan margins,
finance companies;  and bank productivity;
*  introduction  of maximum  *  strengthening  of bank
ownership  limit for an  examination  staff force
individual-family  to 10% and  and more frequent  bank
company  or cooperative  20%;  exams;
accounting  framework:  *  establishment  of
*  introduction  of guidelines  central credit bureau to
on suspension  of interest on  monitor and improve
NPLs and provisions  on bad and  credit information.
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Philippines  *  tightening  of monetary  *  yes  but  there  are  still no  0  yes  *  yes  *  yes  *  yes;  *  yes
198147  policy  and  adoption  of tax  standardized  rules  for asset  *  set  up of
reform  to  improve  revenue  valuation  and  loan  provisioning;  government  agency
side  of budget;  to  administer  and
*  but  central  bank  continued  dispose  of NPLs
to experience  financial  with bank
problems  stemming  from  involvement  and  of
quasi-fiscal  activities  and  special  task-  forces.
substantial  Fx liabilities.
Thailand  *  devaluation  of exchange  *  yes but  regulations  to loss  *  yes  *  NA  *  NA  *  banks  faced  legal  *  in most  cas
1963-87  rate  and  tight  monetary  provisions  and  interest  accrual  problems  in  CEOs  of troubled
policy;  can  be  improved.  recovering  institutions  removed
*  tightening  of fiscal  policy  delinquent  debt;  but  other  managers  at
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Argentina  *  implementation  of several  *  yes,  but  shortcomings  *  lack  of personnel  and  *  NA  *  NA  *  debt  relief  *  NA
198042  stabilization  plans  which  remained;  resources  negatively  measures  were  put
proved  to be  unsuccessful.  *  insufficient  accounting  affected  frequency  and  into  place  to help
practices:  banks  were  allowed  to  quality  of audits.  insolvent  borrow..
exercise  their  own  judgment  for
accruing  interests  on  loans;
requirements  for loan  provisions
treated  leniently;  system  for loan
classification  missing.Table  5: Characterization  of Restructuring  Exercises  42
Argentina  *  fiscal reform but overall  *  yes public banking  system  *  structure,  staffing and  *  NA  *  NA  *  NA  *  NA
1989-9)  public expenditure  has not  came  under purview of  technology  of agency has
fallen, mainly  due to increases  suparvisory  agency and  improved.
in transfer  to provinces  and  subjected  to the same
expenditures  at provincial  regulations  as private  banks;
level;  *  regulations  strengthened  with
*  introduction  of Law  of  regard  to rcserve, capital,
Convertibility;  de-indexation  provisioning  and risk
of contracts.  diversification  requirements.
Brazil  *  implementation  of Real  *  implementation  of Basle  *  good enforcement  of  *  NA  *  yes  *  legal  system  *  yes
Plan; attempt  by government  capital  rules.  regulation  with regard  to  hampers loan
to de-index,  wages,  contracts  private  banks.  collection  efforts.
etc..
Chile  *  introduction  of crawling  *  yes, capital adequacy  *  yes, but had already  *  market-based  *  halt of  *  debt relief  *  yes
981143  peg;  standards  and compliance  ratio  started before  crisis.  monitoring.  rollover  of  measures  for
*  government  tried to use  were strengthened;  banks  group loans.  borrowers  were put
monetary  policy actively to  required  to publish information  in place.
moderate  increases  in interst  on nature and quality of their
rates;  assets  at least three times a year;
*  structural  adjustment  *  accounting  rules were
program  was implemented.  strengthened.
Colombia  *  fiscal adjustment  during  *  yes, strengthening  of  *  yes, now have means  *  yes  *  yes  *  yes; and central  *  yes
1932-87  1985  - 87, due to structural  prudential  regulations,  loan  to supervise  system.  bank netted
changes  in fiscal policy;  classification  requirements  and  companies'  bad debt
*  sharp devaluation.  procedures,  interest  accrual  etc.;  and deposits;
*  code of conduct for bankers  *  debt relief
was introduced.  measures  were put
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Uruguay  *  government  launched  *  yes, new accounting  *  yes:  number of  *  yes, for  *  until 1984,  *  yes, central bank  *  yes
1981484  stabilization  program in 1985  procedures  were introduced  supervisors  increased;  national  banks but  loans were  tried to recover
which  was aimed  at reducing  which covered  classification  of  *  external  auditors are  not for local  rolled  over;  NPLs it took over
fiscal deficit and monetary  new loans and reserves  for  required  to follow stricter  banks.  *  1985: debt  from banks; but
growth rates;  potential  losses;  guidelines.  moratorium  recovery  rate
*  resolution  of crisis  *  introduction  (1989) of  and debt relief  remained  dismal.
imposed  heavy burden  on  regulations  for classifing  measures.
budget with limited collection  assets,  provisioning  of NPLs,
on loans  becoming  major  accounting  of interest  and
source of losses.  exchange  gains and minimum
capital requirements.
Unied States  *  relatively  stable policy  *  easier  rules (RAP) for S&Ls  *  FSLJC  replaced  *  yes  *  yes  *  yes, and  *  yes
1981-91  regime  already  in place  dropped;  *  FIDICIA  mandated  relatively  effective
*  FIDICIA  included  carrots  supervisory  actions
and sticks for banks, with 10%/
the minimum  capital  ratio for
full banking  powers.
~~~..  ....  ..  a.........  ............. R.
Estonia  *  monetary  policy continues  *  yes, regulation  was  *  small agency,  *  all banks  *  no  *  yes, NEB set up  *  yes
1992-94  to be governed  by currency  strengthened  (more detailed  personnel  still being  required  to be  department  which
board affangenent and fiscal  reporting  and stricter  prudential  trained  externally  audited  just dealt with loan
policy remains  tight.  requirements  for banks)  and  *  issue of political  at year-end.  recovery.
accounting  standards  were  independence  and
gradually  moved towards  capacity.
intemational  standards.
Finland  *  fiscal restructuring  aimed  *  yes, implementation  of BIS  *  yes, substantial  *  yes  *  this was  *  yes  *  yes
1991-93  at cuffing  budget deficit;  capital adequacy  standards  strengthening  of  not a condition
*  continuation  of floating  of  combined  with a significant  enforcement  capacity  of  for injection of
marka  that was begun in  tightening  of maximum  risk  supervisory  authority.  govemment's
1992.  exposure limits.  funds into
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Hungpry  *  large  macroeconomic  *  no substantial  improvements.  *  yes  *  NA  *  no  *  flawed  *  no
1990s  disequilibria  remain;  main  bankruptcy  laws.
causes  of deficit are
government's  failure  to
reduce  its role in resource
allocation  and to streamline
social  programs;  costs of bank
bailouts are straining  budget;
*  overvalued  exchange  rate.
latvima  *  fiscal reform aimed  at  *  tighter limits on connected  *  central  bank given  *  yes: external  *  yes  *  yes, though  *  yes
1994-  tighter policy.  lending,  stiffer licensing.  enhanced  enforcement  audits by major  success  not clear
powers,  significant  TA  firms  required, and
must be published
Poland  *  governments  made  *  tightening of accounting  *  some progress  made  *  yes, for  *  some  *  yes; in order to  *  yes and twinning
1992-94  attempts  to bring public sector  standards  by imposing  uniform  towards a more effective  Treasury owned  evidence  qualify for  with foreign  expert
deficits under control;  public  standards  for provisioning  regime  of bank  banks.  support  this  recapitalization  was arranged.
sector deficit  shrank between  against loan losses.  supervision.  change.  banks had to take
1992-94  but widened  again  actions against
with large SOEs continuing  to  delinquent
generate losses and widening  borrowers.
external balance.
*  change to crawling  peg in
exchange  rate policy;
Spain  *  more stable in run-up to  *  yes  *  improvement  in  *  NA  *  NA  *  NA  *  yes
1977-1985  EMS membership.  information  disclosure;
*  design and imple-
mentation  of early
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Turkey  *  government  reregulated  *  yes, but regulations  did not  *  auditing techniques  *  NA  a  no;  *  NA  . yes
1982-85  interest  rates;  contain loan exposure  limit  to  were improved,  but still  *  banks
*  in general,  macro policies  single borrowers  and groups;  too few auditors.  continued  to
pursued  by government  other exposure  limits were  provide loans
resulted in poor macro-setting,  wrought  with exemptions.  to SOEs.
characterized  by high public
sector deficits,  large foreign
debt service  payments,  high
inflation and high real interest
rates.
Sources: World Bank Financial  Sector  Reviews  and Country Economic  Memoranda,  interviews  with Bank Financial  Sector Specialists,  and: Sheng, 1995; World  Bank, 1990,  p.53; IMF, 1995;
Baer/Klingebiel,  1994;  Vittas, 1992;  V. Sundararajan,  V. Thomas,  J.T. Balino, 1991;  The Banker, 1995;  Jorge Marshall  & K. Schmidt-Hebbel,  1994; Rodriguez,  1994; World  Bank, 1989; Felipe
Morris/  Mark Dorfinan/  Jose Pedro  Ortiz & Maria Claudio Franco, 1990;  Blass and Grossman,  1995; Fleming  and Talley, 1996; The Economist,  1995-96;  Financial  Times, 1995; Boris, Long, and
Noel, 1994.Table 6: Analysis of Crisis Countries  46
(increasing=  1)  (between 0-2.  5%  1)  (-5 to  10%=  1)  (yes=0,  no=  1)
BENIN  1988-90  increased  in early 1990s  1  0  1  1  3
CAMEROON  1987-  recovered  from 1987 dip, but fell  0  0  1  ongoing  I
again  in  1992-93
CAR  1980s &  1991-  slowly  dips during the  1980s,  0  0  0  0  0
increased  in 1993
CHAD  1980s &  1990s  has decreased ever since 1987  0  1  0  0  1
CONGO  1980s &  1991-  peaked from 1986-88 and  1992,  0  0  1  0  1
now falling from these marks
COTE  D'IVOIRE  1988-91  decreased in  1989 fairly steady  0  1  0  1  2
ever since
ERII-REA  1993  NA  I  I
GHANA  1982-89  decreased from late 1970s to  0  0  1  0  1
1984, increased from  1985-89 fell
again  in 1990, increased  in 1992,
slight drop in  1993
GUINEA  1985,  1994-95  fairly  steady  0  0  0  0  0
KENYA  1985-89, 1992-  increased  in 1990s  1  0  0  0  1
95
MADAGASCAR  1988  dipped from 1984-88, increased  I  1  0  0  2
since then
MAURITANIA  1984, 1988-93  steady, slight increase  I  0  1  0  2
MOZAMBIQUE  1987-  falling from mid-I980sto  early  0  1  0  ongoing  I
1990s
NIGERIA  1990s  decreased during  the 1980s,  I  0  0  ongoing  I
increasing  slightly since 1990
SENEGAL  1988-91  gradually  falling since late 1970s,  0  0  1  1  2
early  1980s
TANZANIA  1987, 1995  increasing since  1989  1  0  0  0  1
TOGO  1993-  steady during early  1980s, falling  0  1  ongoing  I
since 1986
UGANDA  1994  increased  from 1992 to  1993, lack  0  1  1  ongoing  2
data
ZAIRE  1991-92  increased  during  1990s  1  0  NA  1  2
BULGARIA  - increased  in  1980s, but decreased  0  0  ongoing  0
in early  1990s
ESTONIA  1992  decreasing  0  1  0  ongoing  I
HUNGARY  1991-95  dipped  from 1988-90, increased  I  I  I  ongoing  3
and steady since then
LATVIA  1995  increased in  1993-94  1  0  1  ongoing  2
POLAND  1990s  increased sharply  in 1989, then  1  0  1  ongoing  2
fell sharply in  1990- fairly steady,
increasing since
ROMANIA  1990s  peaked in 1990, falling since then  0  1  0  1  2
RUSSIA  1995  Falling from  1991-94  0  0  0  ongoing  0
SLOVENIA  1990s  increasing  from 1992-95  1  0  ongoing  I
. .. . .. . ..
BANGIADESH  late 1980s-  increased  throughout  the  1980s  I  0  1  0  2
eariv 90s
IND[A  1994-95  increasing  I  I  0  ongoing  2
INDONESIA  1994  increasing  I  I  0  ongoing  2
MALAYSIA  1985-88  increased in early  1990s  I  I  I  1  4
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(increasing  = 1)  (between  0-2.5%  1)  (-5 to  10% = 1)  (yes = 0, no  1)
PHILIPPINES  1981-87  increasing  since 1986  1  0  1  1  3
SINGAPORE  1982  increasing  since late 1970s, but  0  1  1  1  3
fell in 1993
SRI LANKA  1989-93  steady,  increasing trend for the  I  I  I  0  3
last couple  of years.
TAIWAN,  1983-84  increasing  1  1  1  1  4
CHINA
THAILAND  1983-87  increasing  since late 1970s  1  0  1  I  3
AUSTRALIA  1989-90  increases  in late 1980s  1  I  I  1  4
FINLAND  1991  increased  during the  1980s.  0  (  I  1  2
plateau  from 1991-93. fell in
1994
FRANCE  1994-95  dips  in early  1990s  0  0  1  0  1
GERMANY  late 1970s.  steady, increases in early  1990s  I  I  I  1  4
1989
JAPAN  1990s  dipped in  1991, increasing  since  1  0  1  ongoing  2
then
NEW ZEALAND  1987-90  increasing  since mid 1980s  I  0  1  1  3
NORWAY  1987-89  steady, slight decrease from 1992-  0  0  1  1  2
94
S13AIN  1977-85.  1994  steady  0  1  1  0  2
SWEDEN  1991-  gradually  falling  from early  1980s  0  0  1  ongoing  I
l!K  1974-76  increases in late 1980s  I  1  1  1  4
lUSA  1984-91  steady. or increasing  1  I  I  1  4
Lat-: America  .
ARGENTINA  1980-82.  1989-  falling, then rising,  0  1  1  0  2
90.  1995
BOLIVIA  1986-87  increased strongly  in early  1990s  I  0  1  0  2
BRAZIL  1994-95  increased  in 1980s, recovered  I  0  0  ongoing
strongly  from dip in  1990
CHILE  1976,  1981-83  increased  between  1981 and  I  I  I  1  4
1982, fairly steady ever since
COLOMBIA  1982-87  fairly steady, increasing slightly  I  I  I  0  3
COSTA  RICA  several  decreased  during the 1980s from a  0  0  1  0  1
instances  peak  in 1981, plateau  from 1988-
91 has been falling  since
ECUADOR  early  1980s  has been falling since 1988  0  0  1  0  1
MEXICO  1981-91.  1994  dipped sharply in  1988, increased  1  0  1  0  2
since then
l'ARAGUAY  1995  dipped in  1988, increasing  since  I  0  I  0  2
then
URUGUAY  1981-84  falling  0  1  0  1  2
VENEZUELA  1980, 1994-95  decreasing  from early-mid  1980s  0  0  0  ongoing  0
Middle  &  NurdtAftk~~~~~~~~  (MM4  ....  .............
EGYPT  early  1980s,  dropped  in 1991. but steady since  0  1  1  0  2
1990-91  then
KUWAIT  1980s  dipped  in 1992, increased  in  I  I  I  0  3
1993-94
MOROCCO  early  1980s  increased in late 1980s, early  I  I  I  0  3
1990s
TURKEY  1982-85,  1994  mixed, increased  from 1993 to  I  1  0  0
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Benin  21.0  202  286  788% (1988)  -53.5 (1991)  3.74%(1992)  . no
1988-90  [-9.0  (1991)1  7.61  %(1993)
C8be  30.9  27.9  28.6  12.2%(1992)  - 14.9%/(1992)  negative in  *  no  *  questionable: despite  favorable
d'lvoire  6.2%  (1994)  -8% (1993)  1994  and 1995  macro-environment,  banks  hesitant  to
1988-91  -29% (1994)  lend because  of still deficient  legal
- 8.7%  (Sep. 199S)  environment  that hampers  contract
[-0.6%(1993), 17"!.  enforcement.
(1994), and 6.5%
(1995)]
Ghana  24.5  13.4  16.9  72.5%  28.5%  4.2%(90-93)  -1.38%  *  no  *  no: lack  of real sector
1982-89  (1989 -6of seven  (1993-6of seven  [4.4%l  (1994)  restructuring,  poor macro-
restructured  banks)  restructured  banks)  environment.
Guinea  8.9  9.6  80%  20%  26% (87-90)  5.5%  *  1993/4  X  no:  due to failure  of government
1985  [4.6%]  (1992)  to improve  accounting,  regulatory
framework  as well as enforcement  by
supervisory  authority.
Guinea  10.4  9.2  20%  17% (1994)  21% (1994)  13.3%  *  crisis is still  . questionable: since  government
1993-94  (1992)  24% (June 1995)  [4.0%l  (1994)  being resolved,  did not address  non-performing  loan
problems of banks that were not
restructured  and did not improve
regulatory  and accounting  framework
as well as enforcement  thereof
significantly; finally,  macro-
imbalances  remain.
Kenya  30.4  26.7  38.6  1.8%(1991)  -1.6%  *  yes, in  *  no
1985-89  [1.4%1  (1990)  1992  and 1995
16.4% (1990)  -28.0%  *  no: recurrent problems,  unclear
Madagascar  17  15  18  [3.1%]  (1994)  incentives
1988
Nigeria  33.4  19.3  23.3  77%(1991)  -6.5%  (1991)  -19.8%  *  crisis is still  *  inaction  towards insolvent  banks
1990s  65%(1992)  -5.9%  (1992)  (1993)  being  resolved.  exacerbates  problems.Table 7: Evaluating the Outcome of the Restructuring Exercises  49
Senegal  28.7  23.2  22.1  50% (1988)  5.5%  7.8%  *  no  . unclear;
1988-91  (1992)  (1992)
R-.,  ,5-  "2"'~~~ ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  . . .,  ,,,...  R
Indonesia  43.3  45.8  14.2%  (all banks)  6.5%  *  still  *  some actions have been taken on
1992-94  20%o  (public banks)  (1995)  resolving  public banks.
1993  problems.
Malaysia  75.8  66.2  89.1  27% (1987)  10.2  - 14.6%(1989-92)  2.7  . no  *  yes
198!-88  32.9  (1988)  (1994)  [8.9 %]  (1991)
Philippines  33.7  26.7  45.8  23%  3.9%  5.7 (88-91); 12% (88-  1.36  *  unclear: rapid growth of real
1981487  (1985 - commercial  (1994 -commercial  94);  (1994)  credit in recent yeas; shortcomings
banks)  banks)  [3.9%,.  3.2]  in regulatory  and accounting
framework  not completely  addressed;
not clear whether supervisory
enforcement  problems  resolved.
Thailand  54.4  59.1  78.6  22.7%(88-91)  6%  *  no, buta
19834L7  [11.3%]  (1990)  number of
banks continue
to require  close
central bank
attention.
......................  . ..  . ..  . ..  ..  . ..  . ......  .... ,. .. .....  ....  . ......  ..... 0.......  . . ..  . ...........
:  ';  v'.  i-.  ',  :v  ............  .........................  ..  '  R  ..  ...  ...............  RR
Argentina  35.1  21.0  26.2  16.9%o  27%  -15.5% (83-86)  6.6%  (1988)  *  yes,  *  no: macro-imbalances  were not
1980-82  (1983)  (1988)  6.8% (83-89)  445%(1989)  between 1980-  resolved;  number  of shortcomings  in
[1.6%  ,0.1%l  1988:  215  regulatory  and accounting  framework
banks  were  were not dealt with.
closed;
*  crisis of 89-
90.Table 7: Evaluating the Outcome of the Restructuring Exercises  50
Argentina  25.1  11.5  12.8  27%  4.2%  (1990-93)  3.7% (1994)  *  yes (1995)  *  questionable:  since  Argentine
1989-90  (1989)  [5.9%]  . public  government  did only take gradual
sector banks  action  on distressed  public banks;
problems  were  although  fiscal  reform  was  successful
not resolved.  on federal level, overall  public
expenditures  have not fallen; and
public provincial banks  fragile.
DrazAl  79.4  < 1%  (private  banks)  20 - 25% (1994)  *  crisis is still  *  large  provincial  bank problems.
1994  14.8%  (public  banks)  15.7%(1994)  being  resolved.
Chile  39.1  37.8  39.0  4.1%  1%  1.6%(84-87)  3.3%  *  no  *  yes
1981-83  (1982)  (1994)  3.5 %(84-93)  (1994)
[4.  1%/,  5.9%]
Colombia  21.9  18.0  27.0  9.6%(1983)  2.1  (1991)  7.9%h(91.93)  4.5%  a  no  a  questionable:  governmentdid
198247  14.7°/  (1985)  [3.7%]  (1994)  not manage  to  cut large  budget
deficit;
*  accounting  system not
sufficiently  transparent  to detect
banking  problems  early on; and new
financial  companies  not under central
bank purview;  real estate lending
boom.
Uruguay  56.3  42.2  61.2  30.4%  (1982)  25.2%(1987)  4.1% (1985-88)  - 5.4%  a  no  *  questionable
1981-84  - .90/0(1985-93)
[4.6%/,  3.7%]
Venezuela  33.9  27.8  31.7  N/A  -38% (1994)  -13.5%  *  crisis  is still
1994-95  [-3.7]  (1994)  being.
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1'0,0  MMc.MIN  ... 4..........  A  d
.........  ....  0  K.,
***~~~~~4~~~440,.4,,,  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~  4,,.. '44.........
United  62.4  60.9  63.3-  4.1%  2.0%  (1992-94)  None  yc  .s;mainstructural  weakness
States  68.3  [3.4%]  significant  (limitation  on national branching)
1981-91  being corrected;
*  structured,  early intervention
limits scope for regulatory  delay
~~~..  4 ~~~~~  . .0  . 4  o  U  .. 044..  4  .....  400  .4  4  4..........  .....  ....................  '......  ...  .........  44.  '  4  44  . . . :  *
4.4  ... :..i::4  .. :4..94;  4  -4-4..4.  44...
444  ~~~~"M  ........  ....,'...  . ................ 4::::.::  444  ~44....  .. 4 ............  ..  ................  ..  . a..  . ........ 4,4  ,  4  4............  *  44......  .
Estonia  15.0  10.0  6.1%  (1992)  25.1%(1993)  -24.5%  crisisyisstill
1992-94  4%  (1994)  b10.9%r(I994)  (1994)  being resolved.
Finlnd  55  6.  1  59  10..%(1992)  6.7%  (1994)  -10.6%  (1994)  2.2%  *  no  suncle,  banks still relatively
1991-93  5.2%(1993)  [4.0/o (1994)]  (1995)  weak.
Hungary  53.7  3.2%(1993)  1.2%  *  crisis  is still  a  no: for recapitalizations  did not
1990s  0.1% (1994)  (1994)  being resolved.  address  bad loan problems  at banks,
[-2.3%  (1993)1  or stop bank lending to borrowers in
[2.6%  (1994)1  default; also shortcomings  in the
regulatory  and accounting framework
and resp. enforcement  were not
addressed.
Latvia  36.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  too soon  *  too soon  *  too soon  *  not yet  *  promising changes  on supervision,
1994-  but too soon to tell. One of the better
TA programs  on bank supervision in
the FSU.
Poland  32.2  35.9  15.5%(1991)  -2.3% (1993)  -2.00/o  *  still
1992-94  28.8% (1992)  -5.5%  (1994)  (1994)  resolving
25.7% (1994)  crisis.
Spain  80.0  66.0  82.0  10.5%  (86-89)  1.9  *  collapse of
1977-85  5.4%(86-94)  (1994)  Banesto  in
[4.7%,2.9%1  1994.Table  7: Evaluating  the Outcome  of the Restructuring  Exercises  52 ~~~  + ~~~~~~~~~:n,x.x..'c-++~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~..  ......
Turkey  30.2  23.9  29.5  6%(net  of loss  1.24%  (net  of loss  4 9% (1989-89)  -6.0%(1989)  *  yes(1994)  *  no: bankscontinued  to lend  to
1982-85  provisions)  provisions)  .7.9%  (1990)  borrowers  in default  because  of
(1986)  (1990)  interconnections;  regulatory  and
accounting  frameworks  for banks
continued  to be deficient;  macro-
imbalances  remain problematic.
Sources: World  Bank Financial  Sector Reviews  and Country Economic  Memoranda,  interviews  with Bank Financial  Sector Specialists,  and: Sheng, 1995;  World  Bank, 1990,  p.53; IMF, 1995;
Baer/Klingebiel,  1994; Vittas,  1992:  V. Sundararajan,  V. Thomas,  I.T. Balino, 1991;  The Banker, 1995;  Jorge Marshall  & K.  Schmidt-Hebbel,  1994;  Rodriguez,  1994;  World Bank, 1989;  Felipe
Morris/  Mark Dorfman/  Jose Pedro  Ortiz & Maria  Claudio Franco, 1990;  Blass and Grossman,  1995; Fleming  and Talley, 1996;  The Economist,  1995-96;  Financial  Times, 1995; Boris, Long, and
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